

KENNETH COLEGROVE'S OUTLOOK TOWARDS JAPAN

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Background

Among the small group of American scholars specializing in modern Japan, Kenneth Wallace Colegrove (1887-1975) is a recognized name among the academic community, both in the field of political science and in the study of modern Japan. A scholar who had begun his career as an Americanist, Colegrove in the 1920s switched his speciality to the study of modern Japanese government; the reason behind this is not known but Colegrove probably became fascinated by the democratization of Japan (Taisho Democratic Era) in the 1920s. Spending the bulk of his academic life in the political science department at North Western University until his retirement in 1953, Colegrove was well-connected in the American academic community and influential as a result of his position as secretary-treasurer of the American Political Science Association from 1937 to 1946 and a member of the editorial board (1936 -1943) of *Amerasia*, a journal specialising in contemporary US-Asian relations.

This article argues against Tetsuro Kato's portrayal of Charles B. Fahs, Colegrove's student, was the first person in the American government to view the Japanese Emperor as 'the symbol of peace'. While this paper does not dismiss Fah's role in the wartime policy debate about the Japanese Emperor, it is far more important to note Colegrove's pre-war influence in Japan studies in the US in regards to Tasukichi Minobe's constitutional interpretation of the Japanese imperial throne and the Emperor's status as Japan's 'symbol of unity'¹. Furthermore, although Socichi Koseki writes in his influential and award-winning book that Colegrove arrived in Japan in early March of 1946, Cole Grove was unable to land in Japan until 20 April 1946. Contrary to Koseki's portrayal of Colegrove, the North Western University professor played no influential role in the formulation of Japan's post war Constitution. Had Colegrove arrived in Japan at the time when Mac Arthur ordered General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section in the General Headquarter (GHQ), to write a Constitution for Japan, Colegrove's ideas that were based on his pre-war studies of the Japanese politics and constitutional system, would have been at odds with the content of the post war Constitution promulgated by Mac Arthur's staff. This is due to Colegrove's view of reforming the Meiji Constitution were similar to that of proposals made by the Japanese government and by Prince Fumimaro Konoe. Colegrove's late arrival in Japan was probably a blessing in disguise as arriving earlier would have resulted in a dispute with Mac Arthur and Whitney over the contents of the post war Japanese Constitution. Colegrove would not have approved with a constitution that was fare

¹ Tetsuro Kato, "The Origins of the Symbolic Emperor System, 'Japan Plan' and America's Psychological Warfare against Japan" Tokyo, Heibonsha, 2005, pp 238-41.

more democratic than the Meiji Constitution and that viewed the imperial throne as a symbolic monarchy.²

Finally, as suggested by Robert P. Newman, Colegrove was never on the side of the far left of the American political spectrum. Since pre-war years, Colegrove became a conservative anti-communist internationalist.³ This paper examines four issues in order to understand Colegrove's view of Japan and his role in US-Japan relations from the late 1920s to the immediate post war years. Many issues need to be addressed. First, when did Colegrove begin his study of Japan's Meiji Constitution and what academic theories in his field influenced his observation of the Japanese government? Second, it demonstrates that since the early 1930s, Colegrove consistently advocated that the Japanese Emperor was a 'symbol of unity' and a positive influence for liberal trajectory in the Japanese polity. Third, who assisted Colegrove's intellectual contributions as a conservative internationalist in US-Japan relations from the 1930s to the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War? By examining these issues, one realizes that Colegrove's anti-communism and preference for Tatsukichi Minobe's teachings of the Japanese constitution were the central factors that motivated him to support both a moderate reform of the Japanese government and the conservative pre-war internationalists orientation around the Emperor. These thoughts went hand-in hand with his belief in Japan's ability to renew a not-so-drastic liberal democratic trajectory that would be perceived as conservative from people of left-wing persuasions, including those with whom he vehemently disagreed regarding the future of East Asia from the late 1930s to 1945. The significance of Colegrove's visit to Japan in April 1946 can be viewed in the manner in which he brought together conservative internationalists such as himself and Joseph Grew, the pre-war American Ambassador to Japan, Count Shinken Makino, Ayske Kabayama, and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese leaders who were close to Emperor Hirohito.

Colegrove's Perspective Toward Japan's Pre-war Conservatism

Colegrove's study of the Japanese constitution began in the late 1920s. He contacted his acquaintance, Count Michimasa Soejima, a former House of Peers member who at the time was the President of *Keijo Nippo*, a major, Japanese news agency in Korea. In September, 1927 Colegrove sent Soejima a letter requesting his advice on commentaries on the Japanese Constitution and government. Even though North Western University had standard texts about Japanese Constitution in English, French and German but Colegrove was determined to grasp Japanese scholarly debates over the constitution. As none of the scholars in the political science department, including Colegrove himself, could read Japanese, he requested for assistance from the North Western University's language scholars who read Japanese. Colegrove also asked Japanese students to help translate Japanese texts⁴. From the time of his correspondence with Soejima, Colegrove began to write extensively on Japanese political and administrative system. In 1932,

² Shoichi, Koseki, "The Birth of Japan's Post war Constitution", Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, pp 141-143.153-156.

³ Robert PP Newman, "Lattimore and the 'Loss of China'", Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992, pp343.

⁴ Colegrove to Soejima, September 6, 1927. *Colegrove to Soejima*, August 22, 1928, *Japan-Soejima*, 1928-32`KWC, HHL.

he published a two-part series on the role of the Japanese Emperor in the constitution and political system in *The American Political Science Review*. In his article, *The Japanese Emperor II*, Colegrove discussed in that final two pages the possibility of a democratic Japan under the constitution, even though that article was published in the aftermath of the Manchuria Incident and the creation of the puppet regime of Manchuko. Colegrove observed that the Japanese Emperor was not only a symbol; the throne is the very essence of national unity, patriotism, justice and constitutionalism. He noted that,

It is entirely possible to have a liberal development in Japan without formal amendments to the constitution. Much depends, of course, upon the enlightenment of the Emperor, and perhaps even more upon the sagacity and liberalism of the group of men who form the small circle around the Throne. In any case, the initiation of new developments must generally come from the cabinet, for it carries the burden of administration and the parliamentary direction of legislation...the process of amending the constitution is less complicated than that required under the American constitution...in Japan, as in America, great constitutional changes are possible without formal amendment. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the Emperor is the cornerstone of the Japanese polity. This is due not only to the enormous powers which are vested in his person under the constitution, but also, and perhaps more trenchantly, to the traditions of the office and the psychology of the Japanese people, who offer a deep and abiding loyalty to the Emperor.⁵

Colegrove was undoubtedly impressed in view of the Emperor's role in the Meiji Constitution, written by Tatsukichi Minobe, professor from the Tokyo Imperial University. Previously, his work on constitutional theory of the Emperor was vehemently attacked by militarists and ultranationalists resulting in the outlawing of Minobe's work in 1935. Minobe's persecution in Japan motivated Colegrove to have his work translated into English. In 1929, Colegrove received permission from Minobe to translate all of his writings into English. In 1939, Colegrove secured funding from the American Council on Learned Societies to translate *Minobe's Kenpo Seiji*, Minobe's major work on the Japanese constitution. Hugh Borton, a faculty member at Columbia University and also Secretary of the Council of Japan Committee and Colegrove's student, Charles Burton Fahs, assisted Ikuo Oyama's translation of Minobe's book. Both Borton and Fahs, were undoubtedly influenced by Colegrove's teachings of the Japanese Emperor. Fahs was eternally grateful for Colegrove's decision to take him into the graduate school program in political science at North Western University in spite of the fact that Fahs had no prior experience in such studies. Later, as a graduate student, Fahs received a two year grant from the General Education Board in 1934 to study in Japan. He trained at Kyoto and Tokyo Imperial Universities to familiarize himself with the general aspects of Minobe's philosophy through the works and teachings of Colegrove.

In this regard, although Colegrove had been concerned about the rising fascism/militarism in Japan, he perceived Emperor Hirohito as a pacifist and a positive element in the Japanese polity. Shortly after the attempted coup by Japanese militarists on February 26, 1936, Colegrove published a short book in July of the same year entitled, *Militarism in Japan*. In this work, Colegrove pointed out that in Article XI of the Japanese constitution, the Emperor was the supreme commander of the army and

⁵ Kenneth Colegrove, "The Japanese Emperor II", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 26, No.5, October, 1932, pp 834-844.

navy while Article XII indicated that the Emperor also had the right to determine the organization and peace standing of the army and navy. In other words, the Emperor had the sole jurisdiction over the armed forces of the Empire⁶. Because the Emperor personally headed the military forces, it was not under civilian control like in the British parliamentary system. Colegrove understood very well that Japan had a 'dual government system' whereby, the command of the military forces is separated from the regulation of all other governmental matters...the Emperor's military camp and his civil government are thus separated by law, although unity is obtained through the Emperor. Hence, the ministers of war and navy, who are career military officers, play the role of soldier-politician.⁷

He further pointed to the fact that scholars disagreed over the extent of this arrangement, especially on, 'the Emperor's prerogative in the determination of the organization and peace standing of the army and navy'. In other words, although scholars agreed about, 'the character of the supreme command,' they disagreed over the military camp having the sole 'power to fix the size, the recruitment, and the equipment of the army and navy'. Regardless of academic discourses about the civil-military relations in the Japanese government, the question is whether the February 26, coup in Japan was a final turn toward military dictatorship or fascism. Colegrove rejected this thesis,

The bourgeois parties, in spite of the Manchurian incident, have not entirely lost the battle for the preservation of parliamentary government...and there has never been a complete surrender to the militarist. Both the Saito, and Okada cabinet was such surrender, and the formation of a cabinet by Hirota, in 1936, is a distinct rebuff to ultra-militaristic influence.⁸

Furthermore, Colegrove argued,

The Genro, the Emperor, and the circle of high officials surrounding the Emperor have not been in sympathy with the Fascist and militaristic movement. Prince Sionji, the eighty-seven years old Genro, is a steadfast believer in parliamentary government. Through his advice, the high officials-the lord privy seal, the grand chamberlain and the minister of the Imperial Household-tend to be statesmen who prefer parliamentary regime to a military or Fascist dictatorship. And, finally, Emperor Hirohito himself appears to favour constitutional regime.⁹

Colegrove believed that the reason why the perpetrators of the February 26 incident received death sentences was because they disobeyed the Emperor's command to surrender immediately.¹⁰ He also perceived that the army was divided into factions that held widely differing views regarding the role of the services in politics and the degree to which the military should participate in the sector.¹¹

⁶ Kenneth Colegrove, "Militarism in Japan", Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1936, pp16

⁷ Ibid., pp 18 and pp 22.

⁸ Ibid., pp 40-45.

⁹ Ibid., pp 40-41.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp18-19.

¹¹ Ibid., pp 55.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, occasionally, Colegrove began to work as a consultant for free at the Japan Section of the Far East Division, which was part of the Research and Analysis Department in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).¹² His student, Charles Fahs, headed the section. Prior to that, Fahs worked for the predecessor to the OSS, the Office of the Coordinator of Information, shortly after its inception in the fall of 1941. According to Tesuro Kato, Fahs was the chief architect in the OSS who advocated exploiting the Emperor to persuade Japanese surrender and retaining the Emperor as a symbol of Japanese unity in the post war era.¹³ However, Colegrove's influence on Fahs' thinking about the Emperor cannot be discounted.

A year before he began his consulting job with the OSS in December 1943, Colegrove wrote an article in *Amerasia* on October 25, 1942 about the need to retain the Emperor's role.

Colegrove's Anti-Communist Standpoint

It is assumed that Colegrove might have become suspicious of diplomats in the State Department. In April 1945 there was an attempt by John Emerson, an American diplomat, to create a united front between Japanese Communists and Professor Ikuo Oyama. In early April, Colegrove received two letters from Fahs and Hugh Borton, asking Colegrove to meet John K. Emerson, a Japan expert in the State Department. Both Borton and Fahs asked Colegrove to convince Emerson to meet with the Oyamas, particularly Professor Oyama. Both men knew Oyama when fascist elements within Japanese politics were attempting to assassinate him. At that point in time, Colegrove took care of Oyama and his wife when they sought political asylum in the US in 1932. Thereafter, it can be assumed that Colegrove was present during Emerson's long meeting with Professor Oyama and Mrs. Oyama. Oyama handed letters from two Japanese leaders fighting Japanese militarism to Emerson. One of them was active in Chiang Kai-Shek's Chungking and the other concentrated on Mao-Tse-Tung's Yen-an; the latter was the future Japanese Communist Party leader, Susumu Okano, also known as Sanzo Nosaka, Emerson supported Nosaka's idea of a united front approach that urged the Japanese people the need for surrender. And he tried recruiting Oyama to participate in this endeavour by having him join K.K. Kawakami, a Japanese-American journalist in Washington D.C., and others in issuing a joint statement to the Japanese people.

According to Colegrove, Oyama, who had undergone major surgery to remove an ulcer from his stomach the previous year, was unwilling to cooperate, for the same reason he declined requests to help translate Japanese documents for the American government. Even though he wanted to return to Japan and attempt to re-establish his party, he hesitated to make a public statement. Oyama wanted to avoid being perceived as an American collaborator by the Japanese. In addition to campaigning to raise money for Oyama's surgery in 1944, which was done free of charge by doctors at the North Western University Medical Hospital, Colegrove, as he did during wartime, continued

¹² Travel Order from dated December 26, 1943 and other Documents in the 'Office of Strategic Services', KWC, HHL.

¹³ Colegrove to Fahs, October 14, 1941, Folder 2, Box 24, KWC, NWU, Kato, pp 24-26, 76-80, 134-136, 238-242.

to respect and protect Oyama. Sadly, Oyama's illness halted the translation project of Minobe's book after 1942.¹⁴

Subsequently after the German surrender in early May, Colegrove began to establish a close rapport with Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew. Colegrove's appreciation of Grew's endeavours to bring about a Japanese surrender was clearly reflected in his letter to Grew dated around the time of Japanese surrender. August 13, 1945;

I am writing to congratulate you on the statesmanlike management of the Japanese request for a condition to the unconditional surrender ultimatum of the Allies. In spite of a whirlwind of demands from any so-called experts on the Far East for the annihilation of the Japanese Emperor, I believe most scholars support your position with references to the imperial throne. Anyone intimately acquainted with Japanese and politics recognize how useful the Emperor can become to the Allies during the period of military occupancy. I am delighted that you were able to impress this view upon not only the American government but also the British, Soviet, Russia and Chinese governments.¹⁵

Grew was delighted to hear Colegrove's comments and replied on August 20, 1945 as follows,

Your letter has touched me very much and I thank you for it heartily. I especially appreciate your support of the line I have taken to the effect that the only man who could stop the war with Japan was the Emperor as the Japanese armies would never in the world have listened to anything less sacred than an Imperial Rescript. From now on we shall have to be guided by developments in Japan itself, which will probably show us in due course whether the Emperorship is going to be an asset or liability in the complete reconstruction which will have to take place in that misguided country.¹⁶

Grew was impressed by Colegrove's understanding of his role and position in the fierce domestic debate over the future of the Japanese Emperor. Towards the end of the Pacific War, Colegrove had apparently become very suspicious of some of his former acquaintances such as Owen Lattimore, a professor in Chinese and Central Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University and the Institute of Pacific Relations, an institution of which he and Lattimore were members since the pre-war years. Colegrove suspected that people in the Institute like Lattimore, were mere fellow travellers if not Communists and were serving the interests of the Soviet Union.

Lattimore served for eight years until his appointment as an American adviser to Chiang Kai-Shek in June 1941 as the editor of *Pacific Affairs*, a journal published by the Institute for Pacific Relations. In addition, he served as an editorial board member of *Amerasia* shortly after the journal was launched in 1936 by Financier Fredrick V. Field and Philip Jaffe, both of whom in the post war years were identified as communists. Jaffe met Lattimore in China in early 1937 and visited communist leaders in Yenan in late spring of 1937 with Lattimore and few others. *Amerasia's* office was located in the

¹⁴ "In search of New International Order , Philosophical and Human Networks of RIIA, CFR, IPR and the Relations between the Two World Wars", Fukuoka, Kyushu University Press, 1988.

¹⁵ Colegrove to Grew, August 13, 1945, 'Grew', KWC, HHL.

¹⁶ Ibid.,

same building complex as the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) and its editorial board members included (in addition to Lattimore and Colegrove) Cyrus Peake, who was a graduate of North Western University (1922) and later became the head of the Executive Sub Committee in drafting the post-war Japanese Constitution in the Government Section of GHQ. Together with Peake, Chi Ch`ao-ting, a covert Chinese Communist agent who had married Jaffe`s cousin in 1927 was also a research staff at the IPR from 1937 to 1940.

In November 1937, if its editorial policy did not change within a year, Colegrove was already thinking of resigning from the editorial board of *Amerasia*. He perceived *Amerasia`s* editorial policy as pro-China and anti-Japan. Colegrove took a stand of being an anti-Communist interventionist in the 1940-41 debate in the US over intervention in European affairs; he supported American assistance to Britain before Pearl Harbor and served as the Chairman of Evanston chapter of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. But he did not advocate intervening in the Far East. After his return from his assignment in Chungking in late 1942, Lattimore was actively involved in the domestic debates concerning the future of the Japanese Imperial Crown. In spring 1945 Lattimore in his *Solution in Asia*, a widely-read book published in February of the same year, spearheaded an argument to abolish the Imperial Crown, exile the current Emperor and the imperial family members, and expel pre-war elites from Japan`s power structure and replace them with leaders `liberal enough to be friendly to Russia...and China`.. a situation just `as necessary` as `friendly nations` between `a democratic Japan` and the US. Lattimore`s advocacy of supporting Chinese Communists and a Nationalist-Communist coalition led government led by Chiang Kai Shek reinforced Colegrove`s opposition towards those Asian specialists who were sympathetic towards communism and anti-Britain and anti-Dutch, issues that had motivated him to resign from the editorial board of *Amerasia* in May 1943. In addition, Colegrove was undoubtedly irritated by Lattimore`s criticism of Grew and those who supported Grew`s approach to dealing with Japan by trying to use the Japanese Emperor to induce Japanese surrender. Supporters of Grew who held the same view of the Japanese Imperial Throne included virtually all of Japan specialists in the US. Lattimore criticized them in his *Solution in Asia*.¹⁷

Even though Colegrove respected Grew, he was suspicious of the integrity of the State Department because he felt the infiltration by those sympathetic to or serving as agents of the Soviet Union into that organization. Such a perception in Colegrove`s mind became a reality after the *Amerasia* incident in early June of 1945. Colegrove who was about to leave for Japan in 1946, asked Grew not only to write him letters of introduction to his friends in Japan-Count Shinken Makino, Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara, Count Ayske Kabayama and Max Bishop, who was a member of the political advisory staff sent by the State Department to Mac Arthur- but also to solicit Grew`s opinion on the *Amerasia* case, an incident where confidential documents were stolen from the State Department and contributed to leaks of OSS-related activities in Thailand. It seems like that such incidents occurred in the United States because Japan did not have Official Secrets Act as it depends upon old espionage laws. Colegrove asked Grew`s unofficial opinion on

¹⁷ Colegrove to Borton, November 4, 1937, Borton to Colegrove, November 18, 1937, Folder 6, Box 10, KWC; NWU, Newman, 22, 32, 59 and "Amerasia Spy Case, Prelude to McCarthyism", Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

whether this was the problem¹⁸. Grew agreed with Colegrove's point regarding the espionage laws but stayed away from assessing whether or not Philip Jaffe, John Service and others indicted in the *Amerasia* affair were at fault. Colegrove gathered statements by Grew and Secretary of State James Byrnes relating to this incident that was issued by the State Department.¹⁹ In November 1946, Colegrove remained suspicious of the State Department because the two men arrested in the *Amerasia* affair continued to exert influence which in his opinion caused problems for MacArthur's occupation policies. Questions still surround the State Department espionage case of June 1945.

Colegrove's Support for Post-war Japan's Reforms

After Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, Colegrove pleaded a moderate reform of Japan and re-establishing American ties with Japan's conservative internationalists centred around the Emperor. He also became an ardent supporter of General Douglas Mac Arthur. In December 1945, General Mac Arthur contacted the State Department to send a team of American experts to advise him on reorganizing the Japanese government. In a letter dated December 18, Major General J.H. Hildering, Director of Civil Affairs, informed Colegrove that Mac Arthur needed twenty qualified research experts to work in the Government Section of GHQ to assist in restructuring the Japanese government structure. Colegrove was excited about this new assignment and his opinion towards Mac Arthur changed completely and he was now more than willing to advise the Mac Arthur. This was his first step that propelled him to become an ardent Mac Arthur supporter. Colegrove advocated an annotated survey of the Constitution of 1889, with specific recommendations, article by article, for changes in the document, a task that could be accomplished in two months, if undertaken by a small group of men who have already studied the parliamentary system of Japan for a number of years, men such as professor Harold T. Quigley (University of Minnesota), Dr Charles Burton Fahs (Pomona College, and the State Department) and a few others, and of course Colegrove himself. Colegrove argued that the research experts will ultimately base their recommendations to the Commander-in Chief based on the answers to three questions; (i) should the parliamentary system of the central government be changed to another form? (2) if the parliamentary regime is retained, what changes should be made to promote a greater degree of democracy? (3) Should there be extensive changes in local governance? In addressing these questions Colegrove predicted that:

The Japanese parliamentary system should be retained in preference to either a presidential or commission or a one-party system. (ii) Proposals in 1920-1931 by Professor Tatsukichi Minobe (Imperial University of Tokyo), Professor Sakuzo Yoshino and other progressive Japanese jurists are adequate to promote democracy in Japan. (iii) Practically no changes should be made in local government except to; (a) alter the relations of the central and local governments in regard to the Home Ministry and Education Ministry, (b) abolish the kempei or military police, and (c) reform the local police system.

¹⁸ Colegrove to Grew, March 23, 1946, Grew, 'on "Amerasia case"', see Nagao 147-148 and Newman, pp 133-36.

¹⁹ Grew to Colegrove, March 25, 1946, Grew, KWC, HHL.

Admonishing those who advocated 'radical views regarding slashing reforms of the Japanese government,' Colegrove was well aware that his recommendations were 'conservative' but aside from the complete annihilation of militaristic agencies Colegrove's views of constitutional reform were welcomed by Japanese leaders who were considering constitutional reform at the time.

For Colegrove, the proposed annotated revision of the constitution should proceed along the following lines; (i) to include definite prohibitions on militaristic agencies of the government, (ii) to include definite prohibition of militaristic agencies (iii) to retain the monarchy as a constitutional institution as a symbol of stable government (iv) to reduce the Emperor to an organ of the state as proposed by Minobe and others (v) to strengthen the parliamentary government in a manner to produce effective democratic control (vi) to limit the advice to the throne from the Prime Minister alone (vii) to abolish the Privy Council as a controlling organ (viii) to reduce the power of the House of the Peers (ix) to render the cabinet entirely responsible to the majority in the House of Representative (x) to promote free elections (xi) to revise the 'Rights and Duties of the subjects so as to give Japan a modern Constitutional bill of rights'.

Further, Colegrove advocated for two or three American experts who were familiar with the Japanese parliamentary system to be sent to Japan to make the preliminary survey. These men should consult with parliamentarians like Shidehara and Wakatsuki, constitutional jurists like Minobe, administration experts like Masamichi Royama, labour leaders like Kanju Kato and Bunji Suzuki and newspapermen like Nyosekan Hasegawa and Tsunego Baba. Then they should lay down a set of principles for the reform of the Japanese government, followed by a complete annotated revision of the Constitution of 1889.²⁰

North Western University released Colegrove after Mac Arthur rejected the proposed constitutional change suggested by the Japanese government.²¹ Colegrove's departure for Japan was frustrated by red tape from the State Department which delayed the issuance of his passport but he finally left for Japan in early April, Colegrove consulted his Elbert Thomas, a senior US Senator from Utah, to look into why the issuance of his passport was delayed. Thomas was leading figure in Congress who knew the Far East well as he had lived in Japan from 1910 to 1912 as a Mormon missionary (and later became the head of the mission in Japan). He even named his first daughter Chiyo, a common-Japanese female name in spite of the fact that he and his wife were Caucasian. It was a short while after Colegrove contacted Thomas that the State Department finally issued a passport. Thomas saw no conspiracy in this delay, although Colegrove wanted to know who has behind this delay and why.²²

During this stay in Japan, Colegrove met with conservative internationalists of the pre-war elite such as Count Shinken Makino, Ayske Kabayama and Shigeru Yoshida. He even had an audience with Emperor Hirohito shortly before his return to the US in mid-July. The last even was the result of debate in the American government over the future of the Japanese throne and Japanese surrender. More significantly, Colegrove met

²⁰ Colegrove to Lt. Col. R.B. Mc Rae , December 29, 1945, `War Department Civil Affairs 1945` KWC, HHL.

²¹ Colegrove to Hildering, January 29, 1946, ` War Department Civil Affairs, January-March, 1946, KWC, HHL.

²² Colegrove to Thomas, March1,1946, a letter from North Western University to Thomas, April 2, 1946, Thomas to Colegrove April 26, 1946.

Makino at his residence in Chiba Prefecture on May 29 and later briefed Grew about the meeting. In the meeting Count Makino expressed his gratefulness to Ambassador Grew's sentiments of preserving the Emperor as a symbol of Japanese unity. At the end of his visit, Colegrove was asked by Makino if he could present the latter with a written statement of Grew's activities regarding the Japanese surrender. Colegrove could not deny Makino this request and took the liberty without prior consultation with Grew to hand Makino the following summary of Grew's role in the American debate over the Emperor through Makino's son-in law, Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who had just been appointed the new Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister. In this regard, Count Makino was highly impressed with the interpretation by Colegrove on Grew's role in the discourses among American policymakers regarding the Japanese Emperor. Makino decided to forward that information to Emperor Hirohito himself.²³ Shortly before Colegrove returned to the US, Mac Arthur gave his blessing to the meeting on the condition that no publicity is made of this event. Colegrove later informed Grew of the following;

The Emperor asked me to take a personal message to you. He wishes to express regret for the war between our two countries, satisfaction that you've laboured valiantly to preserve peace; regret for the lack of proper courtesies upon your departure from Japan; and gratified for your gracious policy regarding Japan after your return to the United States. The Emperor asked me several questions regarding your service in the Department of State and your policy making while acting as Under Secretary of State. I also conversed with him regarding the present occupation, the achievement of General Mac Arthur, and the proposed constitution of Japan. The Emperor also gave me a brief account of his efforts on behalf of peace during the war.²⁴

Upon receiving Colegrove's letter, Grew expressed his delight about what transpired in Japan between Colegrove, Makino, Yoshida and the Emperor. Grew thanked Colegrove for the information and was relieved that action against the Emperor will not be taken based on prejudices of war. Grew was impressed by Colegrove's knowledge of his activities and role in inducing the Japanese surrender.

Although Grew expressed his pride in contributing to Japan's surrender, he told Colegrove that he had mentioned his role in the Japanese surrender to very few people as what was important was that there was no loss of life and the satisfaction of the magnificent climax of the greatest naval and military campaign in history. In trusting Colegrove, Grew sent him the secret memorandum that he had written to President Truman before the surrender.²⁵ Colegrove was very impressed by this document which reinforced his impression that Grew played a central role in spearheading the argument to use the Emperor to stimulate the Japanese surrender.

Colegrove and Post-war Cultural Exchanges

During his visit to Japan, Colegrove contacted Count Ayske Kabayama whose son-in-law, Jiro Shirasu was a top confidant of Prime Minister Yoshida. Fluent in English as the result of his education in England, Shirasu was serving as a liaison for Yoshida,

²³ Makino to Colegrove, June 9, 1946, 'Makino' KWC, HHL.

²⁴ Colegrove to Grew, August 2, 1946.

²⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, May, 28, 1945, KWC, HHL.

Kabayama and others in the Japanese establishment and GHQ. In January 1946, Grew received a letter from Kabayama, the first one, after the war interrupted their friendship.²⁶ Colegrove was apparently already acquainted with Kabayama and his pre-war activities of promoting cultural exchange between the two countries. In 1938, Colegrove had written a letter of introduction to Kabayama for R. Douglas Stuart, who had graduated from Princeton University. Stuart was planning to visit Japan as part of his trip to study the international situation in the Orient in 1938. During that period, Colegrove was a leader in the Chicago area for the interventionist America First Committee.²⁷

Kabayama was eager to resume Japan's cultural exchange with the United States and he particularly wanted to commence the sending of high calibre Japanese high school graduates to American Universities for a four-year education. Kabayama who received his college education at Amherst College, approached an official in the Education Section of the GHQ who was supportive of Kabayama's idea. Kabayama also received support from both Colegrove and Roy Howard, a newspaper mogul and a friend of Kabayama since the pre-war years, who was visiting Japan for a few days. Colegrove encouraged Kabayama to hand in a proposal to him, Grew and President Nicholas M. Butler of Columbia University.

Kabayama's proposal narrated the history of modern Japan that started with the Meiji Restoration which established a peaceful, democratic, western-style civilization but ended with the process of modernization being interrupted due to the war. During the modernization period, Japan's progress was carried out by hundreds of young men who had studied overseas in Europe and the US, including conservative internationalists such as Count Makino. As such, Kabayama wanted to launch a program to send talented Japanese high school students to American Universities so that they could help Japan resume its peaceful and democratic trajectory. Initially, with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers' (SCAP) approval, the programme was designed to send 50 Japanese high school graduates, just at the right age to enter colleges in the US. Kobayama advocated the following,

Our boys will be selected from fairly well-to-do families; i.e. middle class families that are ordinarily able to educate their sons in any Japanese University and that are able to provide some pocket money ... there are several means of raising the needed funds... First by appealing to my intimate friends among the capitalists, here a drawback is that one's entire capital is frozen now and it requires very special permission by the occupation force for releasing the capital. Second, the money needed may be included in the Reparation; in this case special permission is also necessary. Third, there are seven hundred million now in the charge of the occupation government, which was left unused. Fourth, in case I do not succeed, I may appeal to some foundation such as the Carnegie Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation.²⁸

Upon his return to the US, Colegrove forwarded Kabayama's proposal to Columbia University President Nicholas Butler who showed interest in the proposal. However, the departure of Butler from the University in fall 1947 meant the proposal could not be implemented. Interestingly, the State Department introduced the Fulbright Act

²⁶ Grew to Kabayama, May 17, 1946, 'Kabayama', KWC, HHL.

²⁷ Colegrove to Kabayama, May 17, 1938, June 9, 1939. Kabayama, KWC, HHL.

²⁸ Ayske, Kabayama, 'My private proposition for sending high school graduates to the United States of America' July 18, 1946, 'Kabayama'.

which allocated twenty million dollars for educational exchanges with foreign nations. Colegrove informed Kabayama he was going to ask Senator William J. Fulbright the possibility of permitting the use of this fund the former enemies of the state. However the State Department could not assist Colegrove or Kobayama until the peace treaty with Japan was signed. But Colegrove conveyed to Kobayama that he was working with several others in trying to extend the Fulbright Act to Japan so that funds would be made available for the exchange of students between both countries.

These endeavours on both sides of the Pacific contributed to the commencement of the precursor to the Fulbright program, GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas), and followed by the Fulbright program after Japan regained full sovereignty with the implementation of the San Francisco Treaty in 1952. Kabayama's proposal for sending Japanese high school graduates was realized by Grew with the commencement of the Grew program whose first class of Japanese high school graduates included Akira Iriya, the eminent scholar of US-East Asia Relations at Harvard University.²⁹

Colegrove later contacted the Rockefeller Foundation whose director was his student and wartime OSS East Asia specialist, Charles Fahs. When the war ended OSS was dismantled and Fahs and others in the OSS were transferred to the State Department where Fahs served as Chief of the Far Eastern Intelligence Division. In 1946, Fahs joined the Rockefeller Foundation as Assistant Director of Humanities. Fahs initially thought his involvement with the Foundation would be temporary since he intended to return to teaching as a tenured university professor of East Asian Studies. However, Fahs only returned to university teaching after his involvement in the Rockefeller Foundation as Director of Humanities (1950-1962) and his stint in the American Embassy in Japan as the director of cultural affairs under his old friend Ambassador Edwin Reischauer.

In January 1948, Fahs submitted a confidential report to the Rockefeller Foundation based on his trip to Japan the previous year. In it, Fahs prescribed ways to reintegrate Japanese educators, scholars and journalists into the international community and advocated against American imposition of Western traditions and the discarding of Japanese traditions. In this regard, Fahs took a very critical look at Mac Arthur's occupation policies, a stark contrast to Colegrove who used to revere Mac Arthur. In the end, Fahs did not pursue Kabayama's idea of funding Japanese high school graduates for higher studies in US schools. However, in 1949, Fahs helped realize a program financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and Mac Arthur's GHQ in enrolling Japanese broadcasters into a program sponsored by Columbia University.

Colegrove's Rapport with President Truman

Upon Colegrove's return from Japan, Senator Thomas encouraged him to submit a letter to President Truman on his observations of the American occupation of Japan in terms of the status of the Emperor, the new constitution and progress in political developments. Colegrove informed Truman that the Emperor deeply appreciates America's lenient policy toward Japan, initiated by Truman, President Roosevelt, Ambassador Grew and Senator Thomas. Both Colegrove and Mac Arthur were of the opinion that Emperor was not a forceful character but they were impressed by his sincerity and common sense. With regard to the Occupation, Colegrove praised General Mac Arthur's policy in drafting the new Japanese Constitution as both timely and wise. He further opined

²⁹ Colegrove to Kabayama, August 19, 1946, October 21, 1947, 'Kabayama' KWC, HHL.

that any changes to this policy by a contrary directive from the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), which was ten thousand miles away from Japan, would confuse and confuse the Japanese people which might lead to disaster. Colegrove believed Mac Arthur was correct in dismantling the old autocratic Constitution and was professional in adopting a more democratic Constitution in the shortest possible time-frame. At the end of his letter to President Truman, Colegrove cautioned that among the political leaders whom he met, Sanzo Nosaka of Japan's Communist Party appears to have clout in his party as well as in the Japanese polity.

Colegrove wrote,

I met most of the political leaders of both Japan and Korea, I am particularly impressed with the sincerity and vision of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party. The cleverest man in Japan whom I saw was, I regret to say, Nosaka, one of the leaders of the Communist Party will dominate his party remains to be open. But, because of its connections with Soviet Russia, the Communist Party will continue to complicate the political situation in Japan.³⁰

Colegrove was not upset about Mac Arthur scrapping the Meiji Constitution and creating a new post war Constitution, a decision that substantially weakened his relevance in visiting Japan. He was, however, disturbed by Nosaka, a man who had approached Oyama in April 1945 through Emmerson in forming a united front among overseas Japanese. With regards to political parties, although Colegrove struck close ties with conservative internationalists such as Makino and Yoshida, his letter to Truman gives the impression that he was very enthusiastic about Social Democrats. This may have been a reflection of the preference indicated within the Government Section as to which political party would be worthy of SCAP's support as part of its push for democratization. Although Colegrove pointed to the President the danger posed by the FEC in obstructing Mac Arthur's occupation policy but his criticism of the lack of American government's support for Mac Arthur was better reflected in his letter to Grew.

I sincerely regret to say that I have the impression that the Supreme Commander had not received the full support of his own government. The establishment of the Far Eastern Commission last December was a dangerous experiment in international goodwill. It could only be justified in the event that SCAP would receive the constant and vigilant support of the United States Government in every phase of the negotiations in the FEC.³¹

Colegrove lamented that the War Department had shown considerable neglect in the negotiations in the FEC, while the State Department permitted a policy that was detrimental to the successful administration of the Occupation in Japan. He further opined that directives on food for Japan and on the Japanese Constitution were harmful and ill-conceived.

Conclusion

With reference to post war Japanese democratization, Colegrove initially was in favour of amending Meiji Constitution, however, against his own erstwhile standpoint, he

³⁰ Colegrove to Truman, July 29, 1946, Truman to Colegrove, August 2, 1946, 24, 'E. Thomas, 1940-1955,' KWC, HHL.

³¹ Colegrove to Grew, June 13, 1946, KWC, HHL.

wrote a letter to President Truman revealing his full acceptance and endorsement of Mac Arthur's strategies in spearheading an entire new amendment of the 1889 Meiji Constitution. It was a great coincidence that Colegrove arrived in Japan in late February instead of Mid-April when the new Constitution was already in the pipeline. However, both Colegrove and Mac Arthur shared a common attitude of the role and the position of the Emperor in the post war Constitution. This was a result of Colegrove's perspective of the Imperial system which he studied since the 1930s. Colegrove openly negotiated with conservative internationalists in both the US and Japan. He endorsed the post war Japanese Constitution because he opposed academics like Owen Lattimore and the pro-Soviet group in the FEC, who wanted radical political changes within Japan which might have resulted with the abolition of the Japanese monarchy. It is not surprising that during the post war days, even though Colegrove played proactive roles in strengthening cultural exchanges between the United States and Japan, he was predominantly biased against Communism, which resulted in his favour of McCarthyism, and the political persecution of Owen Lattimore. He also denounced his socialist friend, Ikuo Oyama, who upon arrival in Japan in 1947, broke his earlier promise to Colegrove and began to advocate a common front between the Socialists and Communists against the Japanese government and GHQ. Against this background, Colegrove's worldview toward Japanese political history and development did not transform radically over the years, but it increasingly became shadowed by conservatism and anti-communism.