

FORMULATION OF CONFUCIANISM IN THE SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEMS IN EAST ASIA

Il Cheong Yi

Introduction

Scholarly assessments on Asian values, particularly on Confucianism, have been changed quite dramatically during the development process of East Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. First, it was described as the obstructing block for the development of capitalism until the 1970s, lauded as the driving force of the rapid economic development during the 1980s and the 1990s, and then again criticised as the incubator of the crony capitalism and all the irregularities during the Asian financial crisis at the end of the last century. These different opinions on Asian values, or more narrowly, Confucianism, one of the most important factors formulating the society for thousand years, lead us to two important questions. Firstly, what is Confucianism? Although several Asian countries were deeply influenced by Confucianism, they have different cultures and traditions. They may have different ideas about Confucianism which may be quite contrary with each other. Then, is there such a thing like "definitive" Confucianism? If it is not the case, how do we understand and explain Confucianism?

This paper aims to answer these two questions by focusing on Confucian narratives on social welfare issues in several Asian countries. Social welfare issues are selected because the field of social welfare is the one which is the least westernised than any other fields and is considered as one of the most distinctive fields compared to others. By focusing on these fields we aim to understand the nature of Confucianism, the role of Confucianism as an ideology, and the way we approach Confucianism as a value interacting with society.

In the first section, we will explain how the assessment on Confucianism has been changed and point out the problems in understanding Confucianism. In the second section, we will focus on social welfare issues and the role of Confucianism as an ideology to justify the social welfare policy direction of the society. In conclusion, we will summarise the findings in the discussions and suggest the way we understand Confucianism.

1. Explanations on Confucianism

When Japan and other Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore achieved rapid economic success after the 1970s a dearth of research has been produced by scholars from various fields. They sought to account for the substantive basis of the "Asian Miracle" and one of the main causes for the rapid economic development they found was the tradition and culture of Confucianism.¹

The description of the very factor, however, was quite reverse a century ago when North East Asian countries were forced to open their doors to the Western power. The first comprehensive discussion on Confucianism from the perspective of capitalist development was done by Max Weber. Weber argued that Confucianism had a constraining influence on the development of capitalism.² He argued that socio-economic conditions of traditional Chinese society and the value consensus on the Confucian tradition such as exalting the "cultured man", despising acquisitiveness in profit making and sticking to land ownership rather than commercial business prevented the rise of capitalism. Contrary to the ethics of the Puritans in the Calvinist movement which enabled the rise of capitalism, he explained, the core of Confucianist ethics rejected training in economics, and thus development of entrepreneurial spirit.³

Talcott Parsons elaborated the Weberian arguments about Confucianism and developed a theory to describe and evaluate the relationship between the culture and economic performance of nations.

He suggested a scheme of “pattern variables” consisting of five dichotomous concepts to explain the relationship between culture and economic performance: “affectivity vs. affective neutrality,” “self-orientation vs. collectivity-orientation,” “universalism vs. particularism,” “achievement vs. ascription,” and “specificity vs. diffuseness”.⁴ Based on these conceptual frameworks, he argued that contrary to the modern type of “industrial” occupational structure which was characterised by a “system of universalistic-specific-affectivity neutral-achievement-oriented roles”, the traditional Chinese social structure possessed a combination of opposite characteristics which “blocked the development of anything like “capitalism””.⁵

This Weber-Parsons paradigm was widely accepted by scholars studying the relationship between culture and economic change.⁶ The basic assumption of this rational model is that the central, distinctive feature of modern cultural and economic changes throughout the world is a trend toward increasing rationality, which Western historical experiences have demonstrated. Efficiency, individualism and dynamism were suggested as three characteristics of an industrialised western society.⁷

From Max Weber to the scholars of this rational model, the underlying assumption they share in common is the notion that the “Western model” is universally applicable to the undeveloped and developing societies, and the Asian societies should accept these norms of the Western society in order to achieve economic development.⁸

Scholars began to cast doubt on this seemingly unshakeable assumption following successful economic development of Japan in the 1970s. They began to pay attention to the specificity and particularity of Confucianism which was distinct from the Western norms and principles for economic development.⁹ This academic trend coincided with the interrogation of the universal applicability of the Western rational model.¹⁰ The core of these scholars’ arguments was the critique of some of the Weber-Parsons conceptual formulations. They challenged the Weberian idea that Confucians lacked the equivalent of religiously endowed intention to remould the world which

Puritanists in the West were said to have. Scholars argued that the Confucians intended to improve humanity according to the Confucian interpretation of the world. Metzger suggested that since the Sung times, Chinese Confucianists have believed strongly in the use of an inner “transformative force” to create a world in their image. This inner transformative force was different from the norms and principles of the Western model for economic development but it certainly contributed to the economic development in some of Asian countries.¹¹

After the Asian financial crisis, scholars and journalists tried to pinpoint the cause of this crisis and one of the targets was the Asian culture providing the environment for irregularities of bureaucrats and crony capitalism. These descriptions which emphasised positive or negative aspects of Confucianism concerning the economic development are based on the same approach to Confucianism.

Firstly, they dealt with Confucianism in the hermeneutical way in the sense that they regarded Confucianism as a given text and selected the most relevant features of Confucianism for the analysis of the Asian society.

Secondly, they have a tendency to ignore social actors in formulating the norms and principles of Confucianism and social context within which these social actors played. Since they have been too preoccupied with question of whether rapid economic growth or economic crisis (i.e. social change) is caused by a society-specific-value, i.e. Confucianism, they have not paid much attention to the changing social context and social actors formulating and reformulating Confucianism. They considered Confucianism a given tradition or culture and in their frameworks there was no room for social actors who formulated and reformulated Confucianism. The perspectives were static in the sense that they cannot explain the changes in the Confucianism itself.

2. Confucianism Embedded in the Social Welfare System

The static view of Confucianism is also widespread in the research on

the welfare systems in Asian countries. For instance, in the case of Japan the family, local, voluntary organisations and companies play a significant role in providing people with various social welfare benefits and services, and the low unemployment rate is one of the most distinguished attributes of the Japanese welfare system. These have been explained as the result of the main components of strong Confucian culture such as Confucian familial, communal solidarity and obligations, and insistence on education.¹² The welfare provisions outside the public sector, they argue, are based on the norms and principles of Confucianism and these norms and principles of Confucianism are realised through the societal institutions such as enterprise unionism and families which have a close tie. However, they did not explain how this idea has been formed and who has played a major role in forming these societal institutions. In their researches, there is no room for the social actors to actively formulate and reformulate the contents of Confucianism for various purposes and intentions. There is not enough explanation about how social actors produce Confucianism and react to the changes in the contents of Confucianism.

Another point they misunderstood is that all the activities considered as Confucian are not necessarily based on Confucian ideas. Even though manifest purposes of the various activities are Confucian, the real intentions or purposes of these activities of the social actors can be different from the recognised norms and principles of Confucianism. For instance, one would argue those occupational welfare provisions are based on genuine Confucian principles. However, it can be also argued that neither employers nor employees have any Confucian intention. Their activities may be either rent seeking behaviour of the company owner to secure the supports of the government which tried to strengthen the legitimacy by forcing the company to provide the workers with welfare provisions.¹³ Behind the social actors' activities which are performed under the slogan of Confucianism, there may be a myriad of different intentions of the social actors who pursue their interests.

Therefore, it is quite important to explain the social dynamics between actors behind the development of Confucianism. Then, what kind of dynamics lay behind the development of Confucianism?

3. Tradition, Culture and Confucianism

To understand the dynamics behind Confucianism, we begin with drawing the boundary of Confucianism. In this paper Confucianism is discussed as an ideology or a value system rather than a religion. Confucianism as an ideology or a value system contains elements of both tradition and culture. As we have seen in the previous section, most previous research have employed the concepts of tradition and culture without careful attention to the dynamics behind the formation and reformation of tradition and culture. Therefore, we will focus on how we have to understand tradition and culture in order to understand the dynamics behind the formation and employment of Confucianism.

With respect to the interpretation of tradition, Anthony Giddens' analysis is illuminating. According to him, the meanings of time and space in conventional social science have critical flaws.¹⁴ These shortcomings are related to conceptions of agency and structure breaking with the synchrony/diachrony or static/dynamic divisions that have featured so prominently in both structuralism and functionalism. The study of social activities inevitably involves the elapse of time. This is the case even when we talk about the stable society or stability, since stability itself means continuity over time. As Edward Shills claimed,

“... time provides not only a setting which permits the state of one moment to be compared heuristically with that of another moment. Time is also a constitutive property of society. Society is only conceivable as a system of varying states occurring at moments in time. Society displays its characteristic features not at a single moment in time but in various phases assuming various but related shapes at different and consecutive moments of time.”¹⁵

Incorporating the temporality explained by Shils into the understanding of Confucianism is vital. Conventionally tradition was regarded as “the purest” and most innocent mode of social reproduction. Tradition, in its most elemental guise, may be thought of as an indefinite series of repetitions of an action, which on each occasion is performed on the assumption that it has been performed before. Its performance is authorised though the nature of the authorisation may vary widely by the knowledge, or the assumption of previous performance.¹⁶

Understanding the tradition mentioned above contains the *natural time* in the cognition of “repetition” and “previous performance”. However, tradition lost its feature as cognition of “repetition” and “previous performance” when tradition was encapsulated as “tradition” by “classical scriptures”. This literate tradition is never a pure tradition described above since the authority of written words is not dependent on usage and presumption only. As durable material objects which are made by actors get through processes of transmission and create new patterns of social *time*; they speak directly to remote generation.¹⁷ This process of encapsulating the tradition allows “interpretation” by social actors. The possibility of writings and texts as a written form of tradition can be interpreted in the form of hermeneutics and historiography. Ideological aspects of the tradition arise from this point.

Tradition becomes one of the modes to legitimise established practices as soon as social actors encapsulate tradition as “tradition”. From the standpoint of this general explanation of tradition, Confucianism as an encapsulated tradition has much more visible history than Protestantism of the West. In the Western world, particularly during the period of Enlightenment, tradition was contrasted with science. Western philosophers did not remain at the level of the interpretation of the past, but questioned the very principles of tradition that was the authority the past exercises over the present.¹⁸ Their aim was to replace tradition with science and establish new authority by removing the old one. Even though there

remained many traditional elements, many scientists in the period of Enlightenment argued to discard all the traditional elements for the sake of science. Contrary to the case of Western society, in some Asian countries, over the long time, including the period of “opening doors” to the Western World, there was not any attempt to discard Confucianism as a whole except for one attempt. The Cultural Revolution in China. This is one of the distinctive features in the development of Confucianism as an idea and tradition.

Why was the reaction of some of Asian countries different from the West? If we use Max Weber’s terminology, *Lebensordnungen* or *Weltspären* (spheres of life),¹⁹ contrary to Western society, in Asia political spheres and intellectual spheres were overlapped due to the dual status of the Confucian mandarins who were once the carriers of a world-religion and a stratum of political administrator. These overlapping spheres of life were produced and reproduced through Confucianism and socio-economic condition and enabled Confucian literati to enjoy high status in two spheres, i.e. intellectual life and political life. Great interests of the literati in enjoying this dual status contributed to the maintenance and preservation of Confucianism as a belief system.²⁰

The positive stance toward the tradition in Asian countries with Confucian tradition was, therefore, the result of the action and reaction of the dominant to the changing conditions of society. It was due to the ability of the dominant to capitalise the resources in various fields.²¹ However, preservation of Confucianism was not a process without a struggle. The tradition of Confucianism was not preserved in its original form.

Confucius (BC 551-479) anticipated that the future should be like the past: the decaying feudal society around him should return to the halcyon days in early Zhou dynasty, especially the time of the Duke of Zhou (1127 BC). Han Fei (280-223 BC), a pragmatist critic of Confucianism, condemned such ideas as “ways of antiquity.” To him, it was a method that “serves no purpose.” In short these Confucian

idea and practice²² were condemned by a near contemporary as an attempt to re-write history to serve the perceived needs of the present, and that its practitioners would be doomed to failure. Confucianism found its historical role during the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), the first to proclaim Confucianism as the official ideology. Following the chaotic wars after the fall of Qin (221-206 BC), Liu Bang who was of lowly birth took to power. Confucianism was reformulated for Liu Bang to provide the ideology to legitimise his rule. Confucianism could also be enlisted by both sides of ideological disputes and political struggle over the political reform. This happened in the Wang Anshi-Sima Guang disputes between 1069-76 AD during the Song Dynasty (960-1279 AD). At that time, each political faction used its re-interpretations of Confucianism in the Old and New Texts disputes in the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 AD). On each occasion, they interpreted Confucianism differently to justify its own policies and invalidation of its opponents.²³ Since re-interpretations of Confucianism have always indicated the occasions of political or policy change, or a need to legitimise or condemn a line, hermeneutics and historiography about Confucianism as well as Confucianism itself have a much more direct impact on the lives of people.

This feature of the transmission of Confucianism has been retained in the history of China. Dispute between President Yuan Shikai and Chen Duxiu, then leader of the New Culture Movement and future founding leader of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, initiatives of Chian Kai-Shek, then the leader of the Guomindang or Kuomintang (GMD or KMT: the Nationalist Party) to make *zhong* (loyalty) and *xiao* (filial piety) the foundation of China's social morality and order, and Mao-Zedong's "Pi-Lin Pi Kong" (Criticise Lin Piao, and Criticise Confucius) Campaign are clear evidences.²⁴ All the evidences show how politicians have employed and reformulated Confucianism. To politicians, Confucianism is the main tool to legitimate or de-legitimate authority. To the people, it is the basis of the rules and principles which all-social activities are generated and governed by.

The following speech by Jiang Zemin, the former Party's Secretary

General of the CCP, clearly demonstrates the politicians' approach to Confucianism:

Confucius was one of China's great thinkers... we must thoroughly study his fine ideals and carry him into the futures. . . . [We] should discard [the] superfluous and select the essential. In this way we can best educate . . . our people . . . to carry on our fine national tradition.²⁵

In the arena of social policy, filial piety and community care, which are considered as the main features of Confucianism, have been institutionalised by various regulations by the government. Even though during the period of Cultural Revolution (1965-76) when the Mao's communist party tried to destroy the influence of Confucianism, it tried to use filial piety as a tool to reduce the responsibility of the state over the welfare of the elderly. For instance, the marriage law of 1950 stipulates ". . . children who have come of age have the duty to support and assist their parents." This law was not amended during the Cultural Revolution. Under current law parents of children who do not fulfil their obligations to their parents can appeal to the place of their children's employment. They can appropriate a portion of the wage or grain in rural areas to the parents. In extreme cases of dereliction children can be sentenced to five years of imprisonment.²⁶

Through the programme of community-based care, elderly residents receive regular counselling and home visits by cadres and retirees from trade-union of their former work unit, and domicilliary services are provided to those who require them, including home nursing, home-help and companionship.²⁷ Government promotes the elderly's dependence on community and family care. It is an important means of lessening the need for institutionalised elderly care. For this purpose, the government puts an emphasis on filial piety and community spirit.

The feature of Confucianism that has been used to provide the authority with legitimacy and justification, and thus people's compliance can be found in other countries, too. After PAP (People's Action

Party)'s departure from the Socialist International, Lee Kuan Yew vigorously pursued to make the Singaporean version²⁸ of Confucianism as an over-arching theory for his programme of social engineering. This is a clear example of the transmission process of Confucianism. Taiwan and Hong Kong seem to have more tenuous Confucian features compared to other countries. However, in Taiwan, elements of filial piety and loyalty still play a similar role to that of the days of the New Life Movement during the Generalissimo Chiang's era.²⁹ In Hong Kong even though they are considered to have weaker connection to Confucianism as an ex-British colony, entrepreneurs in Hong Kong are said to be basically Confucian in nature.³⁰

Although the late President Park of Korea asserted that Confucianism should be held back and thus be abolished in the spirit of the Koreans, and his hero was not a Confucian figure but Mussolini, he used the various aspects and features of Korean Confucianism for his authoritarian rule.³² He tried to make *choong* (same Chinese character as *zhong* meaning loyalty) and *hyo* (same Chinese character as *xiao* meaning filial piety) axioms for the social behaviour of people and re-discovered such figures as Lee Soon-Shin and Yi-Yi of *Chosen* era for mobilising loyalty of the people to the government. They were praised for their virtues, *Choong* and *Hyo*, and were considered as a role model for all Koreans. He demonised Confucianism on the one hand and on the other picked up and emphasised some elements to make people compliant politically and pliant economically.³³ Factionalism, laziness, dependency were denounced as the negative aspects of Confucianism. He emphasised that these elements should be replaced with New Community Movement Spirit, i.e. Thriftiness, Self-reliance, and Co-operation, which were said that ancestors had had.³⁴

This kind of political employment of Confucianism took place in many instances in Korean politics. The notable example is President Kim Young Sam's initiation of Segyehwa (which could be translated as "Globalisation") strategy. He used the discourse of Confucianism in tandem with the discourse of "Globalisation" which appears to be clearly contradictory to push through reforms of Korean politics and economics.³⁵

With respect to social policy in Korea, under this ideological influence of Confucianism led by the government, filial piety has been accentuated by various institutions such as company, societies as well as the government. In particular, the efforts by companies were remarkable. For instance, Asan Foundation founded by the Hyundai Group, one of the largest conglomerates in Korea (*chaebol*), addressed the problems of the elderly, the pensioners, the family, and women by awarding Filial Piety (Hyo) prize.³⁶ These social welfare activities by the company were in part due to the promotion by the government. As Park's government had a strong influence on the business through the in-depth intervention into the market such as control over bank credit and access to foreign borrowers, companies, in particular *chaebols* which were almost entirely dependent on bank credit, were clearly aware of the need to stay on good terms with the government to assure continuing access to foreign credit and avoid harassment from the tax officials.³⁷

Government regulations and legislation emphasising filial piety are more remarkable. Government reduced the Inheritance Tax of children living with their elderly parents, recommended companies to consider the applicants family composition, gave various advantages such as buying house, exemption from military service, etc, to breadwinners in families with elderly. All sorts of institutional device were devised by the government to emphasise filial piety.³⁸

Huntington described traditional Confucianism as follows:

. . . classic Chinese Confucianism and its derivatives in Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and (undiluted fashion) Japan emphasised the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights.³⁹

This description seems to be much more appropriate to Japan and Japanese Confucianism than any other countries mentioned. The statist, group-oriented attitudes towards authority were the order of the day in Japan during the 1930s. Even after the disastrous defeat of Japan in the Second World War, this attitude persisted in the long-

unchallenged rule of the Bureaucracy-Liberal Democratic Party-Business triangle. This political coalition contributed to the retention of this attitude.⁴⁰

However, Japanese Confucianism also has its own manufacturers. The origin of the characteristic of Japanese Confucianism can be traced back to the Meiji Reform. When they faced Western power and were forced to open the door to foreign power, Japanese dovetailed Confucianism with the economic purpose of the state. Tokugawa Yoshinobu decided to restore political power to the Meiji Emperor and the new government proceeded to abolish feudalism. Traditional *Han* system was replaced with an administrative district system and it coincided with the emergence of a nation-wide market, rapid capital formation, the appearance of waged labour, the creation of communication networks and the spread of education. The advancement of popular culture was brought about by businessmen and politicians. The Meiji Reform encouraged business class to occupy the place of samurais.⁴¹ Transition from *Tokugawa* to Meiji Reform clearly showed how the Japanese Confucianism was formed. There were two transformations in the Confucian ideology. The first was to reiterate Confucianism-based *bushido* so as to make it a new national ethos to sustain the emerging Japanese capitalist system. Social and economic conditions within Japan and the international environment facilitated this transformation. The second transformation in the Confucian ideology was to combine morality with economics, righteousness and profit seeking.⁴² This transformation, however, took place in the wake of nation building in which new principles of organising systems at the various levels of society were produced and reproduced through the interaction between the social actors and its environment.

As we can see from the discussion above, we can find the national differences in the contents and major components of Confucianism. Confucianism as a culture leads us to the question of national differences among Confucian cultures or spatial dimension of Confucianism. I will explain the spatial dimension of Confucianism separately from tradition, which can be called time-dimension, which

I have explained in the previous section. It should be noted, however, it does not mean that space and time could be separated in the analysis of any ideology or value system including Confucianism. This separation is highly tactical in order to point out the misused terminology and operation of the concept of “culture” in the analysis of Confucianism.

Following Anthony Giddens’ work on culture, we may suggest the types of circumstances that tend to influence the level and nature of the penetration by social actors into conditions of system reproduction as follows:

- 1) the means of access which actors have to knowledge in virtue of their social location;
- 2) the modes of articulation of knowledge;
- 3) circumstances relating to the validity of the belief-claims taken as knowledge;
- 4) factors to do with the means of dissemination of available knowledge.⁴³

With the first point, we mean that the fact that all actors move in situated contexts within larger totalities limits the knowledge they have of other contexts which they do not directly experience. All social actors know a great deal more than they ever directly live through, as a result of the sedimentation of experience in language. However, agents whose lives are spent in one type of milieu may be more or less ignorant of what goes on in others. According to Giddens, this is the case not only in a geographical sense but also in a hierarchical sense in one society. Those in elite groups may know very little about how others in less privileged sectors live, and vice versa. One thing he missed to explain, however, is that there exists power relationship in these geographical and hierarchical relations. This is because knowledge and values themselves and the whole cultural system which they can be informed of are constituted largely by the exercise of “symbolic violence” called “pedagogic action”, and not by some un-coerced process of intellectual agreement.⁴⁴

The second point is related to the question of how far belief claims, that is, Confucian claims are ordered in terms of overall "discourses" and the nature of different discourses. In most common senses, everyday claims to knowledge or belief system is formulated in a fragmentary, dislocated way. On the one hand, this system of dissemination contributes to forming the internal difference among people in a certain nation, on the other to forming the national differences. The third point indicates that individuals may operate with false theories, descriptions or accounts both of their contexts of their own action and of the characteristics of more encompassing social systems. It is obvious that there are sources of possible tension between practical and discursive consciousness. These can have psychodynamic origins, which separate off or muddle the reasons why people act as they do and what they are inclined or able to say about those reasons. But obviously there can be more systematic social pressures by ruling classes that can influence how far false beliefs are held by the members of a society about features of that society. Last point indicates that the relations, historically and spatially, between oral culture, the media of writing, and printing and electronic communication are particularly influential. As the electronic communication developed, due to advanced technology, Western culture occupied the dominant position. Capitalist individualism was regarded as a universal norm and Confucian culture was dealt with like an interesting idiosyncratic case.

In social welfare system, this "culture factor" is of great importance for various reasons. The most important aspect of the culture factor is in the fact that it plays a major rôle to define what the social "needs", "risks" and "contingencies" are. Although R. Titmuss stated in a rather modest fashion that many dependencies are caused by physical or psychological ill health and incapacity,⁴⁵ he clearly pointed out the importance of the culture factor in the dependency itself. Culture itself is made by man (i.e. social actors) and power relationship is inevitably embedded in this culture. The legislation and regulation in which culture is embedded define all kinds of social needs. This socially structured culture about the social needs is constructing a specific attitude and thinking about welfare.

From these basic analyses of the concept of culture, we can answer the question of why Confucianism has different contents in different countries, why there is opposite trends to government initiatives for filial piety, and why there is changing trends such as young educated women preferring to work than staying at home.

These dynamics to form and reform Confucianism as an ideology or a value system influenced the social welfare system in countries with Confucian tradition and culture. Firstly, by manipulating the ideological aspects of the Confucianism, the government has been able to exclude welfare issues of Western context from the decision making process. Strong emphasis on the family and community, and on thrifty facilitate this “non-decision making process”. Secondly, in the domain of private welfare provision, routinised practices of caring family members and perceptions of the welfare have been deeply embedded in the characteristics of Asian welfare systems. The specific characteristics of Asian welfare systems can be found in the design of the specific Asian welfare systems. These systems designs how risks should be shared between the company and the employee. Practices or requirements relating to the indexation of benefits during retirement years, gender differences, the treatment of auxiliary benefits for dependent family members, and benefits in the event of the death or disablement of the worker were structured in these systems in the specific Asian fashion. The recent changes in these specific characteristics can be explained by understanding the ideological aspects of the Confucianism in which change is inherent. In this sense, various explanatory variables such as political, social, and economical variables should be introduced in explaining the social policy in Asian countries.

Conclusion

This paper was aimed at understanding the nature and the role of Confucianism, which has been misleadingly explained as given and static by focusing on discussions on the welfare systems in Asian countries. We found that it is quite necessary to bear in mind the nature

of tradition and culture, i.e. the temporality and spatiality, in explaining Confucianism. Paying less attention to temporality results in the lack of explanation about the historical change of Confucianism and the role of social actors in forming social systems such as the welfare system. Negligence to the spatiality in the analysis of Confucianism results in the tendency to neglect national differences in understanding Confucianism. Changes in the norms and knowledge of Confucianism were not explained.

By introducing dimensions of time and space in understanding Confucianism relevant to the development of welfare systems in Asian countries, we could make sense of the role of social actors in changing the shape and contents of Confucianism and then, historical changes in the Confucian components on which each welfare system relied upon.

Confucianism is thought, rules and principles which have been employed and manipulated by social actors. As we can easily find in history, the ruling class has ample resources to promote a certain component of tradition and culture, and it is true in the case of Confucianism. Dual status which Confucian literati enjoyed in both formal and informal lives provided them with favourable conditions for exploitation of Confucianism as a ruling ideology.

Confucianism is closely related to specific Asian welfare arrangements. Over the generations, it influenced attitudes and behaviours toward welfare of other members of society. However, the real actor behind this significant role of Confucianism was the state and the ruling class who was able to choose, manipulate and employ Confucianism. Various institutions were established to strengthen the influence of the Confucianism and then consequentially Confucianism became considered as a dominant "culture" and a long "tradition" in each society.

Understanding Confucianism is not in reading the text but analysing the actors and institutions by which Confucianism has been cultivated as a dominant ideology.

Footnotes:

- ¹ Adrian Chan. (1996). Confucianism and Development in East Asia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 26 (1).
- ² Weber used the concepts of “culture” and “religion” in explaining Confucianism. In Weber’s terminology, culture is a bigger concept than religion. Culture, in Weber’s terminology, consists of beliefs, world-views and values. Religion is explained as one of belief-systems which characterises the historical stage located between the stage of magic and the stage of science. Ralph Schroeder, *Max Weber and the Sociology of Culture*. London: Sage, 1992, pp.6-12.
- ³ Max Weber . (1951). *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, trans. from German by Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, IL: Free Press), pp.246-9.
- ⁴ Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social System*. New York: The Free Press.
- ⁵ Ibid. pp.177-9.
- ⁶ See, for example, Fairbank, J.K., Eckstein, A., and L.S.Yang. (October, 1960). Economic Change in Early Modern China: An Analytic Framework, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, pp.1-26; Fairbank; J.K. (1972). *The United States and China*, 3rd ed. (1972) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press.), pp. 36-42, 66-71; Dwight H. Perkins, ed., *China’s Modern Economy in Historical Perspective* (Stanford:Stanford University Press); Marion J. Levy, Jr., Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan, in Simon Kuznets, W. E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler. (1955) eds., *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan* , Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1, pp. 496-536; G. William Skinner. (1964-65). Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 24 , in three parts; Albert Feureweker, *The Chinese Economy ca. 1879-*

1911. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan, Papers in Chinese Studies, No.5, 1969; and Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion*.

- ⁷ Hung-Chao Tai. (1980). Introduction: An Oriental Alternative?, in Hung-chao Tai, *Confucianism and Economic Development: An Oriental Alternative?*. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute Press, pp.10-1.
- ⁸ Habermas and Schluchter at the centre of this kind of interpretation of Max Weber which uses the theme of rationalisation as the key concept to a Weberian understanding of social change and the distinctiveness of modern society. Habermas, J. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol.1. London: Heinemann. Schluchter, W. (1981). *The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1981); idem, (1989) *Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective*. Berkeley: University of California Press. As for the criticisms of this kind of interpretation of Max Weber, see Ralph Schroeder (1992), op.cit., pp.1-32. No attempt will be made here to enter this long-standing debate over the 'true Max Weber', since I will confine my concern to the interpretations by scholars researching Confucianism and most of them share that of Habermas and Schluchter's.
- ⁹ See, for example, Hofheinz, Jr. R. and Calder, K.E. (1982). *The Eastasia Edge*. New York: Basic Books; Kahn, H. (1979). *World Economic Development and Beyond*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, Yü Ying-Shih. (1985). *Confucian Thought and Economic Development: Early Modern Chinese Religious Ethics and the Spirit of the Merchant Class*, *The Chinese Intellectual* 2 (Winter), pp.3-55; Harry Hsiao. (1986). *What Can Confucian Thought Contribute to Economic Development?*, *The Chinese Intellectual* 2 (Summer), pp.15-23; Sun Chung-hsing (1986). *From the Protestant Ethic to the Confucian Ethic*, *The Chinese Intellectual* 2 (Summer), pp. 46-57; and Yang Chün-shih.(1986)

The Confucian Ethic, Weberian Thesis and Ideology, The Chinese Intellectual 2 (Summer), pp.58-65

- ¹⁰ See, for example, Gunnar Myrdal. (1968). *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. 1. New York: Pantheon; Edward W. Said. (1978). *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon; Richard H. Minear. (1980). *Orientalism and the Study of Japan*, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 39, pp. 507-17; H.D. Harootunian. (1980) *Metzger's Predicament*, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 39 (February).
- ¹¹ Yü. (1985). op.cit., pp. 19-23; Tu Wei-ming. (1985). *Modern Change in the Confucian Tradition*, *The Chinese Intellectual 2*, (Autumn), pp.90-92. Thomas A. Metzger. (1977). *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture*, New York: Columbia University.
- ¹² Esping - Anderson rejected the view that these are the Confucianistic-specific traits and suggested the similarities with early stages of advanced welfare state and the southern European countries. G. Esping-Anderson. (1997). *Hybrid or Unique?: The Japan Welfare State Between Europe and America.*, *The Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 7, No.3, pp.179-189. His identification of Japan as a 'hybrid', although he reserved the conclusion till the Japanese welfare state mature, is very superficial. He sketched the Japanese welfare state's various approaches to social policies but he didn't explain what the causal force for that trajectory is.
- ¹³ Ilcheong Yi. (2002). *Development of Occupational Welfare in Korea: the Politics of Private Resource Mobilization in Korea*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Oxford University.
- ¹⁴ Anthony Giddens. (1979). op.cit., p.198.
- ¹⁵ Edward Shils. (1975). *Center and Periphery*, (Chicago University Press, p.xiii, quoted in *ibid.* p.281.

- ¹⁶ Pocock, J.G.A. (1972). *Politics, Language, and Time*, London: Methuen, quoted in *ibid*, p.200.
- ¹⁷ Pocock, *ibid*. p.255, quoted in *ibid*., p.200.
- ¹⁸ Max Weber's explanation about the historical development from the stage of magic to the stage of science is noticeable. While explaining the historical development, he emphasises the feature of overlapping spheres of life in the stage of religion and that of separated spheres of life in the stage of science. If we draw on Max Weber's framework about the historical development of spheres of life, we can conclude that contrary to Protestantism, Confucianism enjoyed its wider influence spreading over various spheres of life much longer.
- ¹⁹ Schroeder, R. (1992). *op.cit.*, pp.23-25.
- ²⁰ In general, according to Anthony Giddens, the pre-modern state may have escaped from tradition in the sense of being able to innovate through the use of consolidated power. But it must continually yield to tradition in another way, because traditional beliefs and practices retain their hold everywhere outside the main centres of concentration of state agencies. Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.196. In this sense, in Asian countries, overlapped spheres of life due to the dual role of Confucian literati contributed to the outlasting tradition.
- ²¹ With respect to the capitalising the resources by the Confucian literati, Bourdieu's sociological analysis is insightful. Bourdieu places most aspect of life in the context of objective structures that constitutes what he calls *fields*. A field refers to a configuration of relations between positions. Society as a whole forms a field, which is structured according to relations of domination. According to Bourdieu's sociological analysis, the basic structure and hierarchy of all other fields in the society derives from

the overarching *field of power*. Bourdieu sees this central structure of domination in terms of the opposition between those rich in cultural capital (resources which yields power) but poor in economic capital, and those rich in economic capital but poor in cultural capital. If we apply this conceptual tool to explanation of the power relationships in various fields in Asia, since literati in Asian societies could capitalise both economic capitals and cultural capitals, we can conclude, they could rule all the fields of the society. It was the society which has initial inequality in the social structure. As for Bourdieu's concepts, field and capital, see, P. Bourdieu. (1996). *The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- ²² Analects is made of discourse between Confucius, his followers and many kings in ancient kingdoms in China. Confucius's idea was not only metaphysical philosophy but also highly practical political thought. He travelled around China to look for the master who could realise his political vision.
- ²³ Adrian Chan.(1996). op.cit., pp.29-30.
- ²⁴ As for details, see Wright, M. (1957). *The Last Stance of Chinese Conservatism*. California: Stanford University Press. Strong criticism of Confucianism by Mao during Cultural Revolution was materialised in the process of deconstruction of traditional community in China. It was revived in the most virulent form by Pol Pot in Cambodia. As a follower of Maoism, believing that the family stood in the way of his radical vision of socialism, he tried to break down the capitalist structure by splitting families and forcing people to eat in communal halls. Driven by the virulent Maoism, and his own vision of a racially pure country, Pol Pot destroyed everything Cambodians held dear, unravelling the connections of Buddhism, village life, friends and family. Templer, R. (1998). Ruler of the chasm of darkness, *The Guardian*, 17th, April, p.22.

- ²⁵ Confucius, Still a Subject of Interest. *Beijing Review*, Vol. 32, No.52, (25-31 Dec.1989), pp. 17-21. This article carried another noticeable remark of Gu Mu, the former Honorary President of the China Confucian Foundation which states Confucius was a great thinker, educator, and politician of ... noble character, learned and held in high regard in building our new socialist culture, we should at one and the same time both inherit and reform our nation's traditional culture, including Confucian thought and absorb (and merge) them with advanced aspects of foreign culture."
- ²⁶ Tracy, M.B. (1991). *Social Policies for the Elderly in the Third World*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p.43.
- ²⁷ Ibid. pp.46-7.
- ²⁸ They amended and changed Confucianism by removing the sayings and writings indicating negative aspects of the people seeking profit first, and reconstructing and reformulating a set of new Confucian rites and norms in accordance with the industrial social change. T.J.S. George. (1973), *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore* London: Andre Deutsch, p.193.
- ²⁹ Adrian Chan, op.cit. p.40.
- ³⁰ Redding, S.G. (1985). Operationalizing the Post - Confucian Hypothesis: The Overseas Chinese Case," in K.C. Mun, ed. *Chinese Enterprise Management*. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press.
- ³¹ Chung Hee Park. (1970). *The Country, the Revolution, and I*. Seoul: Hollym. With respect to his enthusiasm for New Village Movement and New Village Movement in the company, it is noteworthy that Moussolini was the founder of Italian company welfare. Moussolini repeatedly appealed to set up company welfare programmes for two reasons: first, to improve

Italy's economic potential by increasing efficiency in industry where management proved to be extremely cautious in undertaking modernisation. The second was to reduce discontent among the working masses by offering private aid programmes and places for workers to meet in their leisure time. Mussolini's maxim clearly shows this Italian combination of scientific management and company welfare policies. Intelligent capitalists concern themselves not only with wages but also with housing, schools, hospitals, and sports fields for their workers. However, companies were reluctant in accepting the company welfare policies. It was from 1928 onwards that company acceptance of social and recreation programmes increased further, when the regime stepped up its pressure on manufacturers, calling on them to accept social responsibility in return for government protection of industry. Elisabetta Benenati. (1998). Americanism and Paternalism: Managers and Workers in Twentieth-Century Italy, *International Labour and Working-Class History*, No. 53 (Spring), pp:5-26, pp.8-10.

- ³² President Park also used anti-communism as a tool to justify his authoritarian rule. However, its operation is closely interconnected with the aspects of Confucianism.
- ³³ Appeal to the relevant aspects of Confucianism to the justification of his authority was accentuated after establishment of his Yushin regime. See, Chung Hee Park. (1979). *Korea Reborn: A Model for Development*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.; Callahan, W.A. (1998). Reconstruction Sino-Korean Relations: Confucianism and identity in Korea. Monograph presented at the 10th Biennial Meeting of British Association for Korean Studies (7-8th of April), p.3. Kwang-Ok Kim asserted that President Park put a priority on *Choong* rather than *Hyo* to force the people to be obedient to the authority. As for this argument, see Kwang-Ok Kim. (1994). Rituals of Resistance: the Manipulation of Shamanism in Contemporary Korea, in Keyes. C.F., Kendal, L. Hardacre, H. *Asian Visions of Authority : Religion and the*

Modern States of East and Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p.201.

- ³⁴ As for *Saemaoul Undong* (New Community Movement), see Jeong Ryeom Kim. (1995). *Han-kook Kyung-je Jeong-chaek 30 Nyun-sa: Kim Jeong Ryeom Hoe- Ko- Rok, (30years' History of Korean Economic Policy:Kim Jeong Ryeom's Memoire)*, Seoul: Joong-Ang Daily News, pp.187-204.
- ³⁵ Bobrow, D.B. and James J. N A. (August 1997). *Korea's Affair with Globalization: Deconstructing Segehwa*, presented at the IPSA World Congress. Callahan, W.A. (1998), op.cit., p.4
- ³⁶ This Hyo prize system has distributed 148 awards of between 10 and 20 million won each for a grand total of 1,277,030,000 won (US\$ 1,596, 278 in August 1997). While the classics tells us that in the filial relationship between fathers and sons it is the eldest son's duty to take care of his parents, many of the prizes went to filial daughters-in-law who live in extended families, respect parents, elderly people, and teach hyo spirit to the next generation. William A. Callahan. (1998). Op.cit., p.15. This foundation was found by Hyundai Group in 1977 when the government initiated the 4th economic and social development planning. Daewoo group also founded the *Daewoo Mun - Hwa Bok - Ji Jae - Dan* (Daewoo Culture and Welfare Foundation) in 1978 and carried out similar activities to Asan Foundation's. The project of establishing these institutions were discussed with President Park and he recommended owners of these groups to establish hospitals in isolated area to serve people alienated from the medical service. Jeong Ryeom Kim, (1995), op. cit. p. 314. As for the activities of Asian Foundation, see, Heung Bong Cha (1998). Sa-Hoi-Bok-Ji= Ji-Won Sa-Up(Support for Social elfare), <http://sun.hallym.ac.kr/~welfare/study/chb1.html>. (2, March).
- ³⁷ Mason, E.S., Mahn Je Kim, Perkins, D.H., Kwang-Suk Kim,

and Cole, D.C. (1980). *The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p.267, pp.336-7.; Chalmers Johnson. (1987). *Political Institutions and Economic Performance*, in Frederick C. Deyo (ed.) *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

- ³⁸ One of the five major annual projects of Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in 1992 was "Making the social atmosphere of filial piety". It involved accentuation of education of filial piety, heavy sentence on the crime breaking the filial piety, giving special holidays to soldiers having parents in illness or birthday and death, inheritance tax exemption for children inherited house more than three generations, special housing grant for children taking care of elderly parents in their house, giving advantage to the children taking care of elderly parents in distributing national housing, and reduction of windfall tax for children living with and taking care of elderly parents. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, "Noin Pokchi 5-taeY Okch Om Sa Op (5 Major Projects of Welfare for the Elderly)," <http://welfare.or.kr/library/library02/text/076.txt>, (23, December, 1997).
- ³⁹ Huntington, S.P. (1991). *Democracy's Third Wave*. *Journal of Democracy* 2, (Spring,), p.24. quoted in Francis Fukuyama. (1995). *Confucianism and Democracy*, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.6, No.2 (April).
- ⁴⁰ Ibid. p.27
- ⁴¹ This combination was based on the Japanese culture, *Bushido* - the moral code of the samurais which was the embodiment of the Japanese concept of Confucianism. In the process of this combination, historic Japanese industrialist, Shibusawa Eiichi played the most critical role. He made the term *shikon shosai*, literally a union of *bushido* and commercial talent (modern

managerial skill) Kuo-hui Tai. (1989). *Confucianism and Japanese Modernisation: A Study of Shibusawa Eiichi*, in Hung-chao Tai, op.cit., p.75.

⁴² Kuo-hui Tai, *ibid.* p.80

⁴³ Giddens, A. (1984). In his terminology here, penetration refers to knowledge and knowledge equals accurate and valid awareness. This usage of Knowledge is different from that in his theory of structuration. In his theory, Knowledge refers to discursive consciousness, op.cit., pp.90-3.

⁴⁴ Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron. (1977). *Reproduction : In Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage Publications, pp.3-68.

⁴⁵ Richard M. Titmuss. (1958). *Essays on the Welfare State*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., pp.42-43.