BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN RATIONALISM AND REFLECTIVISM: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST AGENDA

Ederson Delos Trino Tápia[¶]

INTRODUCTION

The backdrop upon which social constructivism is founded is one characterized by a plethora of major global changes. The end of the cold war, for one has had pervasive effects, not only in the realm of *realpolitik* but also in the discourses concerning it. International Relations (IR), not being detached from social reality, has had its share of major developments. The most obvious has been the crisis of legitimacy that confronted realism, following its failure to explain, much less predict the recent phenomena. Aside from this, a new byword has captured the imagination of almost everyone – globalization, bringing a host of other actors besides the state to center-stage - non-state actors, civil society, and social movements. New theories were needed to explain the existence of these processes of transformation which were nowhere to be found in realist discourse. In addition, there has been a serious challenge to positivism (which is avowedly realism's methodological assumption) by developments both in the social sciences and in philosophy. Furthermore, realism faced major opposition from proponents of neo-liberal institutionalism, which has become increasingly popular as an explanatory model for international politics (Smith 2001:225-226). As all of these were unfolding, alternative approaches to International Relations supposedly more akin to the changing times, were being developed. It is in this context that social constructivism gained ground.

This paper is organized in four main sections. In the first part, it provides a rudimentary discussion of social constructivism by exposing some of its main arguments. In the second part, it looks at the recent debates in IR theory, focusing on the rationalist versus reflectivist contest through a discussion of their major differences especially in terms of their ontological and epistemological concerns. This discussion on the recent methodological debates is imperative as it sets the stage upon which social constructivism's 'bridge building' agenda comes into play. The penultimate section looks at detailed claims of social constructivism as an alternative approach in IR and examines some of its tenets. In the last part, the paper assesses its agenda of bridging the gap between rationalism and reflectivism and offers a critical appraisal of its plausibility. The argument here is that although social constructivism contributes to IR scholarship by putting social, historical, and normative issues back in the midst of theoretical discourse, it however falls short of its promise of being a synthesis for the rationalist-reflectivist dichotomy, due to their inherent paradigmatic irreconcilability.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

Social constructivism is fundamentally grounded on an understanding of the world as the constitutive relationship of the material and the ideational. Identities and interests, contrary to mainstream belief do not have an objective reality. They are products of social practice in a given structure. What constitutes reality is the interaction of the material *and* ideational elements. Knowledge about the world is constituted both by the material and the ideational (Ruggie, 1998:879). By advocating such a principle, social constructivism recognizes the power of the non-rational and immaterial in social and political life. Therefore, an understanding of the world solely resting on material aspects circumscribes and therefore reduces the constitutive powers of subjectivities.

Constructivists place identity and interest at the center of their inquiry. The importance accorded to identity and its origins finds an explanation in Alexander Wendt's contention that "identities are the basis of interests" (Wendt, 1992:398). An actor, be it a state or an individual, acquires its distinct identity through social practice. At the same time, social practice, institutionalized in rules and norms are given meaningful existence by the actors that engage in it. Thus, actors and systems in which they interact are mutually constituted. Identity defines states' interests. Being so, inquiries on how these units behave in the structure are exclusively grounded in it. Ideational elements are not born into the system with the latter shaping the former. Rather, ideas, beliefs, norms are encountered in the system with their meaning and purpose already constituted and this conditions the identity and interests of actors. The constant routinized practice of such elements makes up the system that is in turn recreated by its members' social interaction. Hopf explains that "the power of social practices lies in their capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike" (Hopf, 1998:178). Identity is produced and reproduced by the actors' constant subscription to what is socially practiced. A specific action acquires meaning for the self and for the other and it becomes fixed through practice. Actions then have different meanings as there are many actors understanding them. Through this process, subjectivities acquire a seemingly natural status. And here lies the task of social constructivism: to show and reveal how the inherently constructive was given natural existence. By defining the political in terms of identity, it provides an outlook of knowledge, as explained by Steve Smith (Smith 2001:242-245) that is constituted by interpretative, discursive and historical modes of analysis.

METHODOLOGICAL DEBATES

Much of the theoretical enterprise of academic IR in the past decades addressed the issue of what John Ruggie once asked: "What makes the world hang together? (Ruggie, 1998:855). Inquiries and investigations informed by scienticism and objectivism, intellectual movements that engulfed the disciplinal mode of Political Science decades ago, attempted exhaustively to settle much disputed assumptions regarding the nature of the international system. Answers vary but ultimately, the discourse can be reduced to the ostensibly competing assumptions of realism and liberalism. Following Rousseau's theory of International Relations, neo-realism assumes that under conditions of anarchy, there is no guarantee that states will not end up going to war against each other, as they are anxious to begin it when their

own interests tells them so (Waltz, 1959: 180). Neo-liberal institutionalism on the other hand, has an optimistic regard for the international system where cooperation is possible (See Keohane, 1984). Underneath these debates lies the rationalist paradigm that characterized IR discourse of the Cold War era.

The rise of neo-realism as the most potent approach to International Relations came at the height of academic debates regarding the nature of theory. For Waltz, theory is a "tool which makes the task of intellectual explanation possible" (Burchill, 2001:88). They are not descriptive statements about phenomena in world politics but rather, they are theoretical constructs tasked to assist in explaining international affairs (Waltz, 1990:32). Waltzian neo-realism argues that through the isolation of domains like society, polity and economy, meaningful explanations can be derived from randomly selected facts. It is because of this that intellectual inquiries must treat facts and theories distinctly (Waltz, 1990:22). This approach, dubbed as "structural realism" found its way to international politics and became the basis of Waltzian IR.[1] In explaining IR, Waltz sees the primacy of system level analysis over the unit level. He believes that the state system is a well defined structure which conditions and determines the relationship of states with each other.[2]

Neo-liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, has a different take on the matter. Keohane recognizes anarchy and the constraint that it imposes on the international system. However, he also sees the likelihood of cooperation as institutions and regimes are significant forces in international relations (Lamy, 2001:190).[3] Unlike Waltz, Keohane and Nye see the "manipulation of interdependence, international organizations and transnational actors" instead of military force and influence as the primary instruments of state policy (Keohane and Nye, 1996:62).[4] The existence of these institutions and organizations ensures multiplicity of channels of contacts among actors, governmental and non-governmental, directly altering state perspectives and expectations. Thus, it is not impossible to see states and governments collectively deciding on issues that are important to them (Keohane and Nye, 1996:60).

The debates between the neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists brought to the mainstream rationalist ontology and epistemology. In addition, this happened when academic temperaments of the period swung towards scientific objectivism. Against this backdrop, peripheral perspectives collectively falling under the rubric 'reflectivists' mounted a challenge to rationalism's discursive dominance. They call for the emancipation of International Relations from the circumscribing effect of rationalist worldview and methodology. Proposing to problematize subjective bases of human action, they promise to provide a better illumination of world politics. This debate between rationalism and reflectivism set the stage for the arrival of yet another controversial approach to International Relations – Social Constructivism. Social constructivists hold the promise of bridging the gap between the two paradigms. Critics and supporters continue to debate on its prospect but already it has made much impact on how the world polity is to be understood.

RATIONALISM

Rationalism traces its roots to economics and rational choice theory viewing actors as rational beings capable of choosing the best alternative actions for survival and maximization of gains. The world of rationalist discourse revolves around the

concept of the state with exogenous, given interests whose behavior in a system is informed by a specific a priori role or identity. Such argument presupposes that identities and interests have an objective being. As an approach to International Relations, it assumes that the state system is made up of actors that are "atomistic egoists, whose interests are formed prior to social interaction, and who enter social relations solely for strategic purposes" (Reus-Smit, 2001:214). Accordingly, states have well-defined and articulated identities and interests prior to their entry into the international system. The system serves as the structure where needs and desires are satisfied. From here, one would see the influence of a Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body. Rationalism recognizes that the world has objective external existence and that it is the task of the subject to discover the immutable laws of nature governing the operation of reality. To achieve objectivity, it necessitates a science that can bear "on the facts in ways that permit explanation and prediction" (Burchill, 2001:88).

Its main strands include neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, ostensibly offering competing claims about the character of international politics. However, the debate between the neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists that dominated International Relations for quite some time is not conditioned by competing ontological or epistemological issues unlike that of the rationalist-reflectivist divide. In fact, there is not much that separates the two perspectives as they both subscribe to a similar view of the world they are trying to study, and have the same notion of what constitutes knowledge about it. Their point of divergence lies primarily on the possibility of cooperation (or lack thereof) in the context of international politics.

Neo-realist discourse begins with the assumption that the state is the foremost unit of analysis in the study of international relations. These units operate in an international system characterized by anarchy, which conditions their behavior and relationship towards other units. Kenneth Waltz explains that "with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire, conflict, sometimes leading to war is bound to happen" (Waltz, 1959:159). In this anarchic system, survival is the primary consideration behind state actions. States' entry into relations is something that is strategic. Furthermore, actors enter it with an already defined material, fixed and natural interest. Articulating such an assumption, in effect, means that they are independent of state's identity. In the context of anarchy, state interests are drawn not from a concept of individual well-being but from the instinct to survive (Grieco, 1995:160). No unit can ever induce states to cooperate with other states since "there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them" (Waltz, 1959:232). War is inevitable because nothing can prevent it (Waltz, 1959:232).

The security environment of the Cold War era demonstrated the superiority of neo-realist analysis. This is expected as the concerns brought about by the rivalry of superpowers made realist explanations of concepts such as war, alliances, and cooperation simple but powerful (Walt, 1998).

Neo-liberal institutionalists on the other hand offer an optimistic view of international politics. While realists see conflict and competition, they see cooperation. Furthermore, they argue that institutions can promote international cooperation without considerably shaping or influencing their interests and identities. This is because state interests are individually defined (Grieco, 1995:159).

Keohane explains that states possess rationality that is "consistent and ordered preferences and capacity to calculate costs benefits to maximize the utility of alternative courses of actions" (Keohane, 1984:27).

Prisoner's Dilemma is a concern for neo-liberals. States may be motivated to engage in cooperative actions but the absence of a regulative power and with states' high regard for individual payoffs, cheating or defecting is a logical step to be taken. The "lack of a central agency to enforce promises" makes the structure uncertain and breakable. This highlights the role of international institutions in world politics. Insofar as they are capable of devising mechanisms for regulating the game, institutions can minimize uncertainty, increase reliability of cooperation and predictability among members. Institutions therefore can facilitate cooperation.

REFLECTIVISM

Critical commentators of academic IR hold the view that the neo-realist/neo-liberal institutionalists (neo-neo) debate is offering a myopic view of the international polity. Limiting the political within the purview of the state and institutions subsequently impairs our understanding of how the world works. Insisting on a 'demarginalization' of the subjective in the discourse, the reflectivists see an emancipatory project for academic International Relations.

While rationalists see individualistic and materialist units operating in a system that is natural and fixed, reflectivists uses non-rational and ideational elements as reference points in their inquiry. Having an objective world to analyze, the task of the rationalist is to discover the laws and regularities of the political world. This requires a science that can quantify its propositions. At the heart of the rationalist project is an overriding desire to fashion a social science in the image of the natural sciences. Conversely, the reflectivist looks at the known world as a subjective creation of imaginative and intellectually enterprising social beings. These articulations are normative and so are insoluble to empirical and formal science.

There are several strands of the reflectivist approach offering diverse perspectives in understanding international politics. For ontological and epistemological reasons, reflectivists are one in repudiating rationalist analyses. By presenting some and discussing its core assumptions, we could see the richness of the reflectivists' readings of world politics.

Critical theory, just like all the other reflectivists, believes that the world is devoid of any inherent laws and that its supposed regularities can be broken. This is because the social world, which appears to us as natural, is a result of constructive activities of human beings. By emphasizing the contingency of the social world to time and place, it assumes that "the social is changeable and historical" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003:248). Power and its relationship with knowledge are essential to critical analysis. The relationship of the two can be appreciated in the relationship between subject and object. Critical theory believes that the two do not exist independently of each other. The act of knowing itself is informed and conditioned by the moral, political and ideological temperaments of the knower thereby making knowledge and its production essentially biased. What humans account for as reality is something that is constructed rather than discovered. For this reason, claims to knowledge should be treated with suspicion, for its production was intended for some form of domination.

The structure that is defined by social relations has the dominant actor appropriating identities and interests. The social world is grounded on the exercise of power and thus, domination and subordination. For critical theorists, the state is a dominating instrument and that the state system is creation of the most powerful state.

Using Chris Brown's definition of **normative theory** (See Smith 2001:230), IR is seen as involving a discussion of the most basic normative issues that govern the interaction of units within the state system. According to him, normative theory applied to IR is the "body of work which addresses the moral dimension of international relations and the wider questions of meaning and interpretation generated by the discipline. At its most basic it addresses the ethical nature of the relations between communities/states" (Smith 2001:230). Since the state system is constructed by the units' interaction with each other, it is inevitable that international relations be assessed and evaluated using normative considerations. Among them are the ethical issues connected with war and peace, human rights, justification for international intervention, and environmental responsibility to future generations. These issues are informed by subjectivities that in themselves are sources of activity. These elements are treated as "facts" that have to be qualified and empirically tested. What the approach wants to offer is a "theoretical account of those normative rules, institutions and practices" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 260).

In International Relations, normative theory assumes that states' decisions are informed by their moral and ethical outlook of the world. Moral decisions depend on how states view units as bearers of rights and duties in world politics. One view is that of cosmopolitanism. For this perspective, an analysis of international politics requires the constant invocation of individual human beings and the entire community of humans as units and as sources of rights and duties. On the other hand, communitarianism conceptualizes moral decisions using states as referent objects since they are seen as bearers of rights and duties in the state system (Smith 2001:230).

Post modernism, just like critical theory argues that all forms of knowledge claims are founded on some kind of power relations (Smith 2001:240) What people recognize as the truth is nothing but the product of such relations. Such a conclusion would lead us to think that there is no such thing as *truth*, only concepts of contingency. This relationship between knowledge and power is crucial in an understanding of the world. If what constitutes knowledge in the world is a result of domination and subordination, what and who we are including the structures upon which everything is founded, then our identities serve as what scholars call "conceptual prison". Such being the case, knowledge, for the post modernists constitutes emancipation from these "metanarratives". Fundamental to post-modernism is the assumption that objectivity is impossible as there could be no objective reality existing outside of the subject – a repudiation of rationalism's foremost ontological principle.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: AN ALTERNATIVE

As pointed out earlier, rationalism views the international system as structurally anarchic. Presuming this would accord to the structure causal powers. From the

structure, states draw their identities and interests. For neo-realism, it is the anarchy of the international system that effectively defines states identities and behavioral expectations. For neo-liberal institutionalism, it is the institution with its regulative rules that shapes states' relations with the others. Whichever the case, states are regarded to have identical meanings and interests regardless of time and space. By presenting a structure where units operate on an objective reality, rationalism closes the discussion on the issue of identity and interest. Such narrow rationalist characterization of identity and interests reduce the constitutive roles of social practice in the structure.

Social constructivism as an approach to International Relations argues that its own interpretation of some of the basic concepts making up the rationalist debates using reflectivist constitutive assumptions could offer an alternative and empirically testable appreciation of world politics. By accomplishing this tremendous task, it hopes to offer itself as a synthesis to the rationalist-reflectivist debate.

Structures in the social constructivists' perspective are seen more of a result of process rather than of nature (Wendt, 1992:394). It utterly disregards suppositions which appropriate a given and objective existence to units of analysis. Neo-realists agree among themselves that anarchy is the reality of world polity and that state interests are drawn from it. What the neo-realists fail to problematize is the causation of such structure. How neo-realist concepts such as anarchy acquire logic of their own is an issue which social constructivists are eager to unpack. Inasmuch as anarchy is a structure regulating human actions, using Giddens' notion of duality of structures, it also recreates itself. A discussion of the nature of actions and structures of this kind would lead us to Wendt's celebrated analysis that "self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992:395).

Social interaction provides actors a window of opportunity to know others. They are indeed relational (Wendt, 1992:397). Actors are different to different actors. They possess motives, intentions, and roles that are completely contingent in a given context. How actors recognize others become the basis of their expectations on the behavior of other actors. It is necessary that a state assumes multiple identities as there are multiple contexts. Social constructivism's critique of a neo-realist definition of identity would expose how small the world is as states operating on a uni-dimensional system have limited choices to take and ascribe limited meanings to actions.

Cooperation, neo-liberal institutionalists argue, is motivated by states' inherently rational and egoistic nature. The willingness to cooperate on the part of self-regarding states is conditioned by their desire to maximize the system's utility to them. Such a definition of state interest leads to anarchy but that is quite different from the neo-realists' ideas. The strong predisposition of states to resort to cheating and deception out of the desire to maximize gains would inevitably lead to a Prisoner's Dilemma, an uncertainty that confounds the possibility of cooperation. Rational choice solves this by creating international institutions that would fill the power vacuum in the system. Through these, promises are enforced and defections punished. Consequently, credibility and reliability of the structure is enhanced which in turn conditions the behavioral expectations of states. Structures then manifest their identity through the performance of their regulative functions. With

these strategies and mechanisms to which states can refer to, uncertainty in the international system is diminished.

Stopping here accounts for neo-liberal limitations. And social constructivism picks up where neo-liberalism left off. Such limited analysis of the state system is grounded on a circumscribed meaning neo-liberals have appropriated to identity. Practices within social structure do not just have regulative functions but also constructive ones.

The international system is not just characterized by regulative rules. As the rules solidify through actors' constant repetition and practice of them, they do not just condition the states' behavioral expectations. Rules, inevitably, are recreated and assume identities that are constructed socially. These structures as they become deeply embedded in the entire process of social interaction lose their regulative function. They lose their original meaning as social constraints and instead "define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social activity-that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity" (Ruggie, 1998: 871).

ON BRIDGING THE GAP

The possibility of social constructivism bridging the gap between the competing IR paradigms of rationalism and reflectivism is as controversial as the concerns over which rival camps have raised their claims to truth. Each paradigm proclaims the superiority of their analysis and methodological tools over the other. But the critiques made of each other also reveal the limitations and shortcomings of their assumptions. What this means is that the source of an approach's strength is also the source of its own weakness (Ruggie, 1998:882).

What gives rationalism credibility and reliability as an analytical approach is the universality of its propositions. The wide agreement among its proponents as regards the concepts and tools to which the object of inquiry is to be subjected makes rationalist causal theories and explanations practical and satisfactory. What is problematic with rationalism is not so much its epistemology as it is its ontology. By assuming that its units of analysis have fixed and natural existence, it ultimately shuts off discussions on other potential meanings each unit may acquire.

On the contrary, reflectivists of various strands share the same strength that lies with its ontology. Its capacity to appropriate meaning to its subjective units enriches the discussion and ably illuminates those aspects that mainstream and traditional approaches fail to address. By opening the universe of the political to multiple constructions, it offers creative and innovative re-reading of the world and thereby an impetus to change it. As Hopf explains,

> "hypothesizing differences among states allows for movement beyond the typical binary characterizations of mainstream international relations: democratic-non-democratic, great power-non-great power, north-south, and so forth. While these common axes of analysis are certainly relevant, constructivism promises to explain many other meaningful communities of identity throughout the world" (Hopf, 1998:194).

However, there also exists the critique that reflectivism lacks specification (Ruggie, 1998:883). The problem with this is that it "does not specify the existence, let alone the precise nature or value of its main causal/constitutive elements: identities, norms, practices, and social structures" (Hopf, 1998:197). Such "underspecification" undermines the credibility and reliability of the approach and could give us "an understanding of a process and an outcome, but no a priori prediction per se" (Hopf, 1998:197).

Seeking a middle ground for each paradigm to dwell in harmony necessitates some form of theoretical and methodological compromise. In terms of ontology, the acceptability of social constructivism in International Relations by rationalists depends on the latter's expansion of analysis to include ideational/subjective elements. The step was taken by the social constructivist project and resulted in an interpretation of rationalists' basic assumptions like anarchy and cooperation in the light of subjectivity and constitutiveness of units. In the area of epistemology, the credibility and reliability of an approach employing non-rational, immaterial units of analysis depends on its subscription (in a Kuhnian sense) to "normal science" (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996:65).

Social constructivism as a synthesis of the rationalist-reflectivist debate is in itself problematic – though if successful would altogether change the face of academic International Relations for a long time. Articulating neo-realist assumptions like anarchy, security dilemma, and balance of power in a social constructivist plane, on the one hand, and the notion of cooperation and institutions of the neo-liberal institutionalists, on the other, would not just proffer a middle ground for both competing streams of the rationalist approach but serves as a basis for rationalist and reflectivist synthesis. Doing so would discredit the mainstream assumption regarding the uni-dimensionality and homogeneity of reality, something that can find relative acceptability with reflectivists. But this is true only insofar as ontology is concerned.

Social constructivism as an approach to International Relations according to Ruggie "does not aspire to the hypothetico-deductive mode of theory construction. It is by necessity more 'realistic,' to use Weber's term, or inductive in orientation" (Ruggie, 1998:880). The primary consideration of the social constructivist project is to interpret the meaning and relevance ascribed to any given situation by actors whether they are individuals or states without affecting the logic of explanation (Ruggie, 1998:884). Given this task, when social constructivists "attempt explanation, they engage in 'normal science,' with its usual desiderata in mind" (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996:65). What exactly normal science means is something that is questionable, and in fact invites more debate. Social constructivist explanations require a 'science' whose normality hinges on the mainstream approach. For Wendt and for social constructivism, "social science must be anchored to the world via the mechanisms described by the causal theory" (Wendt, 1999:58).The correctness of any tool of analysis rests not just on its usage - if the rules are carefully being followed - but also on its applicability to units being analyzed. Causal theory can be employed both to the natural and the social world but they are taken and appreciated differently. The first seeks to explain while the other intends to understand (Smith, 2000:159). Applying 'normal science' to ideational, immaterial elements like identity, interest, norms, motives, and values in effect searches for a causal explanation of their constitutive nature. But as reflectivists point out, the social world cannot be subjected to positivistic science.

Between the subject and the object there is discourse which is highly subjective. Inquiring how social constructs acquire a seemingly natural existence through causal theorizing risks a misrepresentation of reality.

CONCLUSION

Judging from the above consideration, social constructivism cannot be a synthesis of the rationalist-reflectivist debate. It cannot offer a middle ground for both schools as their claims to knowledge about the world and their methods are fundamentally irreconcilable. If something is to be proven from the social constructivist project, it is that it is more rational than reflective. Turning rationalist concepts inside out using constitutive arguments does not guarantee reflectivist appreciation. Assuming that meaning or identity is a product of process rather than structure as Wendt would want everybody to believe, the explanation of the process that made it so requires "normal science" that would quantify the effect of the material on the transformation but not the ideational. On the other hand, understanding the ideational through interpretative tools relegates the material from the equation. Thus, a synthesis of the approaches requires a synthesis of their methodology. Establishing then a social constructivist approach entails subscription to a "normal science" that could quantify and demonstrate its findings - something which is totally unacceptable to reflectivists. Subjecting units of analysis to demonstration and replication justifies rationalism to the effect of defeating reflectivist proposition.

This failure in bridge building is even more pronounced by focusing on the work of Wendt. For one, his work does not really delve into much reflectivist ontology, enough for Smith to call him a 'thin reflectivist,' lacking in the amount of depth that characterize post-modernists (Smith 2001:245). Indeed, there is no dialogue between reflectivists and rationalists to begin with, since Wendt hardly represents the former. His predisposition towards rationalism is further betrayed by the label he gives to his brand of social constructivism – "scientific realism." In fact, he articulates the same realist shibboleth of the state being the primary actor in international relations (Wendt, 1992:424). Clearly, this slant towards realism (and rationalism essentially) lets down any of his attempt at reaching out to the reflectivists. Simply put, the gap is just too wide for any bridge to connect, much less one built by Wendt's social constructivism, which is undoubtedly rational in nature.

ENDNOTES

[¶] Associate Professor of Political Science, College of Governance and Public Policy, University of Makati, Philippines 1215.
E-mail: edersontapia@perdana.um.edu.my or ederson17@yahoo.com

[1] According to Kenneth Waltz, "by depicting an international political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, neo-realism establishes the autonomy of international politics and thus makes a theory about it possible" (Waltz, 1990:29). From such understanding of the nature of theory, prediction of states' behavioral responses is most likely.

[2] The very condition of the international system forces states to exhibit similar behavior regardless of time and place, capacity and ability. States are socialized into the anarchy of the structure which requires them to regard each member with distrust and to pursue their goal of security through military power and violence. Anarchy constricts states' interest within the realm of security making them essentially identical. Though states' function within the international system is similar, the unequal distribution of power among them spells out the difference in their capacity to perform those functions. (Burchill, 2001:91). This makes international cooperation most unlikely.

[3] He explains that state goals vary from time to time as international relations consist of "multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy" (Keohane and Nye, 1996:55) making trans-governmental politics difficult to define. As such, actors are left to their own preference in the pursuit of their goal.

[4] As a result, military options in securing state goals are devalued as international organizations and institutions become available as linkage instruments by weak and poor states (Keohane and Nye, 1996: 57).

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